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Our lead article is a thorough review of the 2010 Iowa judicial-reten-tion elections by Professor Roy Schotland, a leading authority onjudicial elections. He provides a thorough context for the 2010 elec-
tion cycle, a detailed discussion of what took place during the Iowa campaign
season, and his thoughts about the likely impact from the defeat of three Iowa
Supreme Court justices.
Professor Schotland has been following judicial-selection systems, includ-
ing elections, for decades. He has authored five amicus briefs for the
Conference of Chief Justices, including an influential brief in Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). We think you’ll find his review of
the 2010 Iowa election worthy of careful consideration.
Please note on the facing page in AJA president Mary Celeste’s column that
the AJA will be hosting a symposium aimed at
educating judges about judicial-retention
issues and methods, as well as a workshop to
teach judges about what they can do to keep
both their own jobs and an independent judi-
ciary.
United States Magistrate Judge Morton
Denlow, who spends a great deal of his time
getting cases settled, provides seven tech-
niques for breaking impasses during judicial
settlement conferences. Judge Denlow pro-
vided a great article for us in 2002 on how to
get judicially encouraged settlements properly
documented. See Morton Denlow, Concluding a Successful Settlement
Conference:  It Ain’t Over Till It’s Over, CT. REV., Fall 2002, at 14. We’re pleased
to have him return to our pages with another practical article about how to
achieve settlements whenever that’s at all possible.
Our final article is a review of the leading non-criminal cases from the
2009-2010 Term of the United States Supreme Court. Kansas City lawyer Tim
Davis reviews all of the important cases involving civil procedure, the right to
bear arms, freedom of speech, employment discrimination, and federalism.
This completes our two-part review of the 2009-2010 Term; Professor Charles
Weisselberg’s review of the criminal decisions was in our last issue.
We also have a review of an interesting book by Professor Steven Lubet, a
law professor at Northwestern University and a member of Court Review’s
Editorial Board. Good, readable books about legal history aren’t plentiful, but
Lubet is a master at merging law and history and good stories. Judge Karen
Arnold-Burger provides a review of Lubet’s book about the importance of the
Fugitive Slave Acts in the years leading up to the Civil War and the role that
attorneys and judges played, an interchange that provided an important back-
drop for the debate over slavery and the run-up to the Civil War.—SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 149.  Court
Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or reject mate-
rial submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact January Serda at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit:  Mary Watkins (mayrswatkinsphoto@earth-
link.net). The cover photo is of a building called Ali’iolani
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Court. The building once served as the seat of govern-
ment in Hawaii. The building’s courtyard features a gold-
leaf statute of King Kamehameha I, who established a
kingdom in Hawaii in 1810.  
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American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member sub-
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ARE YOU PREPARED FOR YOUR JUDICIAL
ELECTION OR RETENTION ELECTION IN
NOVEMBER 2012? 
The ousting of three Iowa Supreme Court Justices has sent
shockwaves throughout the country for all judges, no matter
their method of selection and retention. Not only are justices
and judges in election states suddenly vulnerable to judicial
opponents with large war chests, even those in retention-elec-
tion states are now vulnerable on issues that may
bring players backed by large war chests. Iowa,
as a retention-election state, was not alone in
encountering organized efforts to remove jus-
tices from state supreme courts. Alaska Justice
Dana Fabe squeaked by in her retention election
despite anti-abortion/pro-traditional-marriage
issue opposition; three justices up for retention
in Colorado staved off a redistricting-issue oppo-
sition; two Florida justices tied to an issue on
federal health-care legislation won with the lowest approval
rating ever; in Illinois, Justice Kilbride headed off big money,
also over a redistricting decision; and four Kansas justices man-
aged to keep their jobs with the assistance of a full-page cam-
paign ad. In both Iowa and Colorado, the justices did not
engage in any campaign activity. In Kansas they did. What was
the strategy, if any, used in each of these states by these justices,
and why? These are the types of questions that will be
addressed in an upcoming AJA seminar and workshop.
According to an article within this issue of Court Review,
Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Accountability or
Rampart Passion? by Professor Roy A. Schotland, “there was
less support for retention, on average, than had been the case
from 1998 to 2008. Support also declined even in states with-
out organized opposition to retention. . . . The six states with
organized opposition saw these declines in the percentage vote
for retention:  Iowa 27%-28%, Illinois 13%, Colorado 10%-
13%, Kansas 6%-7%, Florida 6%-9%, and Alaska 7%.” Gone are
the days when retention-election judges could shake their
heads at their election brethren and think, “Boy do we have it
better.” In fact, because retention-election judges have no expe-
rience running campaigns and have a more difficult chal-
lenger—an elusive issue—some may argue that retention-elec-
tion judges actually are in an inferior position to their election-
selected counterparts. 
The bottom line is well stated by Samuel W. Seymour,
President of the New York City Bar Association, as quoted in
Professor Schotland’s article:  “When a judge suf-
fers an electoral defeat because he or she exer-
cised judicial independence, we all suffer.” The
judiciary as the third branch of government, the
branch that is seen as an impartial body that is
responsible to balance the other two branches of
government, may be in jeopardy of diminished
power if judicial independence is threatened by
ideologic or partisan politics. Judges and justices
have a duty to protect the judiciary.  
Although there are several national organizations that cur-
rently focus on judicial elections, they are restricted to some
degree by their 501(c)(3)C3 non-profit status. The AJA as the
Voice of the Judiciary® is a national judicial organization that
is well positioned to address the challenges to come. Plans are
in the works for a symposium that will involve national orga-
nizations, academia, lawmakers, sociologists, cultural experts,
and, most important, justices and judges to edify all of us about
the methods of selection and retention. In conjunction with
this symposium, the AJA will hold a workshop tailored to give
judges and justices the toolboxes and tools necessary to main-
tain their judicial independence—without fear of being ousted
in either a retention or judicial election—in November 2012. 
MARK YOUR CALENDARS NOW! PLEASE JOIN
THE AJA AND NATIONAL EXPERTS FOR A SYMPO-
SIUM ON THE METHODS OF JUDICIAL RETENTION,
AND A COMPANION WORKSHOP ON JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS AND JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS,
MAY 17-19, 2012, IN NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE.
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President’s Column
Mary Celeste
STEVEN LUBET, FUGITIVE JUSTICE: RUNAWAYS, RESCUERS, AND
SLAVERY ON TRIAL. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2010. 367 pp. $29.95.
The seeds for the Civil War were first planted at theConstitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787according to Northwestern University Law Professor
Steven Lubet, in his new book, Fugitive Justice. Lubet provides
detailed accounts of important trials and of the persecution of a
judge after a controversial ruling, as well as the historical con-
text necessary for the reader to better understand this volatile
period in American history.
The first chapter, “Slavery and the Constitution,” demon-
strates that slavery became a topic of debate when attempting to
determine the size of the House of Representatives. Were they
to measure a state’s size based on the number of “free” inhabi-
tants or on property value? And if so, should slaves be counted
as property? The Southern delegates made it clear that slaves
would have to be counted for an agreement to be reached. The
North felt that giving the Southern states more delegates
because of their slaves rewarded the abhorrent practice of slav-
ery. In addition, they argued, if they were going to be counted
for representation, why not make them citizens and give them
the right to vote? A compromise was drafted by James Wilson
of Pennsylvania, a well-known opponent of slavery, and Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, a bold defender of
slavery. Known as the Wilson-Pickney proposal, it eventually
became the three-fifths provision, counting three-fifths of the
population of slaves for enumeration purposes. 
The slaveholders were not finished, however. They felt it was
important that they be able to apprehend fugitive slaves in the
North as criminals. Without much debate, a final slavery-favor-
ing provision was added:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be dis-
charged from such Service or Labour, But shall be deliv-
ered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due. (Article IV, Section 2, U.S.
Constitution, later superseded by Amendment XIII.)
Known as the Fugitive Slave Clause, its adoption was viewed
as necessary by the South, according to Lubet, as a direct result
of Somerset v. Stewart, 98 E.R. 499 (K.B. 1772), a 1772 British
decision. James Somerset, a Virginia slave, was taken to
England by his owner, Charles Stewart. Somerset escaped, but
was recaptured and placed on a slave ship headed for Jamaica.
There was no doubt that Somerset was a slave under the laws of
Virginia. However, there was no comparable English statute
authorizing slavery. A group of British abolitionists became
familiar with Somerset’s predicament and filed a writ of habeas
corpus on his behalf. The English court had to decide which
law would govern Somerset’s status. Lord Mansfield’s decision
was clear:  slavery was morally and politically wrong and noth-
ing should be done to support it. A slave’s status does not fol-
low him from place to place. Therefore, he reasoned, if there is
no specific statute to the contrary, a slave becomes a free man
once he steps foot on free soil.
Although the decision was limited to England, it concerned
the Southern slave owners enough that they felt they needed
constitutional protection from such a rule in the new United
States. Many, including Lubet, believe that had it not been for
the Three-Fifths Compromise and the Fugitive Slave Clause,
there would be no United States of America. 
Almost immediately, conflicts arose between states. Several
Northern states viewed attempts to capture runaway slaves as
“kidnapping” and refused to adhere to the Fugitive Slave
Clause. In response, Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793. It passed with no opposition in the Senate and an over-
whelming majority in the House. The Act allowed slaveholders
to seize and arrest runaways and take them before a federal
judge or magistrate. If the slaveholder was able to establish that
the person was in fact a runaway slave, the judge had a duty to
give the slaveholder a certificate authorizing the slave’s return
to the person from which he or she fled.  Another portion of the
Act made it a crime to obstruct or hinder a slave’s capture or to
conceal a runaway. Passage of the Act was seen as an attempt to
placate the Southern states and keep this fragile union born in
Philadelphia in place.
As more states entered the Union, Lubet illustrates, new con-
flicts arose as the political gulf between free states and slave
states widened. Within the next 10 years the lines of demarca-
tion became clear with all of the original Northern states hav-
ing either abolished slavery or established gradual emancipa-
tion. Any new states created in the Northern Territories would
have to prohibit slavery. At the same time, slavery was flourish-
ing in the South, expanding from 650,000 Southern slaves in
1790 to over four million by 1860. When a new state sought to
enter the Union, much debate ensued regarding the balance of
power between slave states and free states. Free states gradually
started adopting laws to prevent the kidnapping of “free people
of color” and providing criminal penalties for wrongful enslave-
ment. The fear was that in their zeal to capture and return run-
aways, slave “catchers” were kidnapping free blacks. These
statutes made it increasingly difficult for masters to reclaim
their slaves. Enter Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842), in
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1793 was self-executing and independent of any state regu-
lation. Every slaveholder had a positive right to recapture his
slaves anywhere in the Union without being impeded by local
laws. The power to legislate for the recovery of fugitives
belonged exclusively to Congress, as Justice Storey wrote. 
Fugitive Justice: 
Slavery and the Law in Pre-Civil War America
Karen Arnold-Burger
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Since Prigg found that fugitive slave catching was exclusively
a federal duty, free states began adopting laws prohibiting the
involvement of their courts, sheriffs, or even use of their jails
for rendition of fugitives. This again made life difficult for the
slaveholders because there were limited federal officials and vir-
tually no federal jails at the time. Southerners were becoming
more and more disillusioned with the North’s obvious intent to
sabotage their efforts whenever possible, in clear violation of
the compromises that convinced them to become a part of the
United States to begin with. Staunch revolutionary patriots like
Daniel Webster jumped to the defense of the South and chas-
tised the Northern states for reneging on their promises. By
1850, Congress was forced to amend the Fugitive Slave Act to
beef up the exclusive federal authority and make fugitive slave
rendition as simple as possible. Not only did it provide very lit-
tle due process for the fugitive, it put stiff penalties in place for
hindering the process in any way, including use of state courts
to protect fugitives. It allowed federal marshals to call upon any
bystander to help and imposed penalties if they refused, includ-
ing the right of the slaveholder to sue obstructionists civilly for
the value of the “lost” slave. 
Though the Compromise of 1850 “seemed to be working,”
as Lubet writes, “tensions reemerged with the eruption of the
Kansas-Nebraska controversy.” The Kansas-Nebraska Act was
signed into law in 1854, allowing all questions pertaining to
slavery in the Territories to be left to the people residing
therein. This was viewed as a repeal of the Missouri
Compromise, which had set a demarcation line between North
and South, slave and free states. Northerners felt that if
Southerners did not have to comply with the agreed-upon
“boundary,” they should not have to adhere to the Fugitive
Slave Act. 
The next 10 years saw several notorious Fugitive Slave Act
cases in which Northern sympathizers rescued captured slaves
and were then tried with violations of the Act and even treason.
Capturing slaves in the North, particularly the Boston area,
became an extremely dangerous proposition resulting in the
deaths of both slave catchers and slave rescuers. 
Lubet presents detailed accounts of three such trials. He
includes fascinating background information about the attor-
neys involved and trial strategy, and he even provides excerpts
from trial transcripts. At a time when opening and closing state-
ments could wind on for days and parties to the proceeding
were not allowed to testify, Lubet has painted a picture of the
trials of interest to both lawyers and historians. Arguments
involving “god’s law v. man’s law,” whether an “unjust” law can
bind anyone, and whether it is acceptable to violate one law to
enforce another make these trials relevant 150 years later. Each
trial brings clarity to the reasons that the South felt pushed to
secession:  the Union had not lived up to its promises. 
Judges will be particularly interested in some of the ethical
issues faced by judges who sympathized with the abolitionists,
but at the same time were bound to uphold the law. Of particu-
lar interest is the chapter titled “Judge Loring’s Predicament” (p.
207). Edward Greely Loring was a part-time federal “Fugitive
Slave Commissioner” charged with reviewing warrants for the
arrest of fugitive slaves in Massachusetts (an abolitionist strong-
hold) and presiding over their rendition hearings. Loring was
also a Probate Judge for Suffolk County, Massachusetts, and a
faculty member at Harvard Law School. He was a highly
respected legal scholar. He found himself in the position to rule
on the rendition of Anthony Burns. Lubet sets out the details of
the trial, which resulted in Commissioner Loring issuing a cer-
tificate allowing Anthony Burns’s owner to remove him from
Massachusetts and return with him to Virginia. 
Loring became a pariah in Boston. He was hung in effigy,
accosted by strangers on the street, and shunned by colleagues.
There was even talk of having him tarred and feathered.
Harvard chose not to renew his teaching contract. A campaign
was initiated to oust him as Suffolk County Probate Judge. The
Legislature conducted hearings in response to petitions filed for
his ouster for being a “slave commissioner.” He filed a response
stating that he had done nothing more than discharge his
“painful duty” to apply the Fugitive Slave Act to the case before
him, a law which had been held constitutional by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court. Surprisingly, Richard Henry
Dana, the attorney who had represented Anthony Burns, ended
up being his most eloquent defender. Although he argued that
Loring had decided the case in error and showed little human-
ity, he had not done so because of misconduct or corruption. He
pointed out that the public was better served when judges were
protected from the powers of the two other branches of gov-
ernment, even when they make mistakes. “We must do justice
even to our enemies,” he argued (p. 224 n. 38).
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Legislature voted to
remove him from office. However, the Governor was required
to assent to make it final. Massachusetts Governor Henry
Joseph Gardner was elected on an anti-slavery platform. He
shocked everyone when he refused to assent in the action. In a
statement that will warm the hearts of judges everywhere, he
said:
It may be pertinent to ask what the duty of judges is.
Are they to expound the laws as made by the law-making
power; or are they to construe them in accordance with
popular sentiment? When the time arrives that a judge so
violates his oath of office as to shape his decisions accord-
ing to the fluctuations of popular feeling, we become a
government, not of laws, but of men (p. 225 n. 40).
Unfortunately, three years later when a new, less sympathetic
Governor took office, Judge Loring was removed from office. 
Lubet’s book is an interesting analysis of the importance of
the Fugitive Slave Acts in the years leading up to the Civil War
and the role the attorneys and judges of the time played in
using it as a platform to shape the debate over slavery. The trial
discussions remain relevant to today’s legal practice and Judge
Loring’s story illustrates the continued need for judicial inde-
pendence, especially when in opposition to popular politics.
Karen Arnold-Burger joined the Kansas Court of Appeals in March
2011 after serving since 1991 as a municipal judge in Overland
Park, Kansas. She serves on the executive board of the National
Conference of Special Court Judges, which is part of the American
Bar Association’s Judicial Division, and previously served as presi-
dent of the Kansas Municipal Judges Association. She has been an
adjunct faculty member at the National Judicial College since
2000. Arnold-Burger received her J.D. from the University of
Kansas in 1981.
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The 2010 Iowa judicial elections were, as former ArkansasGovernor Mike Huckabee said soon after, of an “historicnature,” likely “one that . . . will give legs to a larger move-
ment over the next few years.”1 The election he referred to, in
which Iowans voted against retention of three justices who had
participated in their Supreme Court’s unanimous decision to
uphold gay marriage, surely is one of the most significant judi-
cial elections ever. It also was the highest-visibility judicial elec-
tion since 1986, when Californians voted down the retention of
Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her colleagues.2
Even before election day, the 2010 judicial election cycle
was unique: never before had so many states had organized
opposition to a justice up for retention—this  time, six states.3
Although only in Iowa was the opposition intense and ulti-
mately successful, the widespread efforts and the result in Iowa
may well open a new era of heat in judicial elections of all
types—retention-only as well as partisan and nonpartisan.  
Notably, though, in the five states other than Iowa with
opposition to judges in 2010, there was less support for reten-
tion, on average, than had been the case from 1998 to 2008.
Support also declined even in states without organized opposi-
tion to retention.4
Unlike the impact of the 1986 California event, which had
occurred because of Bird’s consistent reversal of scores of cap-
ital cases and had little if any ripple effects, this time several
specific reasons point toward more challenges to incumbent
judges.  Not only are more contests likely, but well-informed
observers fear that judges’ actions on the bench may reflect
increased concern with possible public reactions to decisions.
In the remainder of this article, I will place the Iowa reten-
tion-election contests into context regarding how judges are
selected, focusing on recent changes. I will then review what
happened during the Iowa election itself. With that back-
ground in place, I will offer some personal opinions—first,
regarding the Iowa campaign itself; next, regarding the likely
impact of the Iowa election and its result; and last, regarding
steps that might be taken to reduce the likelihood of more
attacks on judges.
SOME CONTEXT ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Of all state appellate judges and general-jurisdiction trial
judges, 89% face some type of election.5 Facing retention-only
elections are 42% of appellate judges and 19% of general-juris-
diction trial judges; facing nonpartisan elections, 20% of appel-
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Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election:
Appropriate Accountability or Rampant Passion?*
Roy A. Schotland
Author’s Note:  To a number of Iowans and others, I am immeasurably
indebted for their wisdom, information, and dedication to shared val-
ues in protecting and promoting our constitutional order and the rule
of law.
Footnotes 
* For James Madison’s memorable treatment in the Federalist
Papers of the dangers in the “tyranny of [the people’s] own pas-
sions,” see note 28 infra.
1. Mike Glover, Huckabee Says Ousting of Iowa Judges Historic Move,
Associated Press, Nov. 22, 2010. Huckabee was “in Des Moines
courting evangelical conservatives . . . .” Id. Huckabee was not the
only leading Republican to speak out in support of the electoral
majority shortly after the vote. Newt Gingrich, also campaigning
in Iowa at that time, said that the four justices who had not been
on the ballot should resign. Kathie Obradovich, Gingrich:
Remaining Iowa Justices Should Resign, DES MOINES REGISTER online
commentary, Nov. 16, 2010, available at http://blogs.desmoines
register.com/dmr/index.php/2010/11/16/gingrich-remaining-iowa-
jus tices-should-resign/. Two other Republicans with a national pro-
file also supported the “message being sent” by the Iowa voters—
Congresswoman Michelle Bachman and former Senator Rick
Santorum; both spoke on C-Span, one in a broadcast talk and the
other in an interview. See Amy Gardner, Pairing Religious with
Fiscal Sets Iowa Tea Party Apart, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 2011,
p. A3. 
Meanwhile, the president of the American Bar Association,
Stephen N. Zack, wrote an op-ed for the Des Moines Register urg-
ing that we protect courts from intimidation. Stephen N. Zack,
Warning Bells in Midwest:  Protect Courts from Intimidation, DES
MOINES REGISTER, Nov. 24, 2010. And the president of the New
York City Bar Association, Samuel W. Seymour, said that “[w]hen
a judge suffers an electoral defeat because he or she exercised judi-
cial independence, we all suffer.” Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2010 (available on Westlaw at 2010 WLNR 22229693). A
Washington Post editorial argued that merit-selection systems
“would better shield judges from the most corrosive aspects of
political elections” and that judges “should not be swayed by the
political whims of the day.” Firing Judges, WASHINGTON POST, Nov.
5, 2010, p. A20. 
2. See ABA TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Part 2), 5 (1998) (“ABA TASK FORCE
REPORT”). On that contest’s unprecedented campaign spending,
see Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add:
Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1406-
07 (2003).
3. See A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving to Oust Judges Over Decisions,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, p. A1. The significance of this move-
ment in 2010 is shown by the New York Times’ decision to run an
article about it on the paper’s front page.
In the past, organized opposition to justices in even two states
in one year had occurred only twice. In 1986, organized opposi-
tion succeeded in California (see note 2 supra); also, one Nebraska
justice faced some organized opposition. In 1996, a Nebraska jus-
tice was denied retention; he had authored a unanimous opinion
invalidating a term-limits law and was opposed by a national orga-
nization that spent an estimated $200,000 (no disclosure was
required or given). That same year, Tennessee Supreme Court
Justice Penny White, the first to face a retention election there,
late judges and 41% of general-jurisdiction trial judges; and
facing partisan elections for initial terms, 33% of appellate
judges and 38% of general-jurisdiction trial judges.6 Unlike
the system of appointing federal judges, unchanged since
1789, judicial selection in the states is not only varied but also
has been subject to frequent controversy and change since the
early 19th century. The states started with appointment sys-
tems, but in the early 19th century many replaced appoint-
ments with partisan elections; then during several decades
around 1900 many states went to nonpartisan elections; and
from 1940 to the end of the 1980s many turned to “merit” sys-
tems, with screening committees sending nominations to the
appointers and the appointed judges subsequently facing the
voters for retention or rejection.7
For present purposes, we must pay special attention to
developments beginning in the 1970s. Judicial elections, what-
ever the system, for generations were almost always as unex-
citing as “checkers by mail.”8 The first notable change
occurred in 1978 in Los Angeles County:  because of rulings by
some trial judges appointed by then-Governor Jerry Brown,
the deputy district attorneys early in that election year literally
ran an ad in the daily legal newspaper offering to support any-
one who would challenge an unchallenged incumbent judge.
That effort produced elections lively enough that some
changes followed: e.g., judges increased their appearances at
community affairs, issued “state of the court” reports, and
invited jurors to visit chambers after a case.9
Over the next decade in Texas, unprecedented campaign
spending occurred as part of the battle between plaintiffs and
defense lawyers over the
conduct of tort litigation.
After several Texas elec-
tions, the defense side had
won that contest and
spending shrunk to minor
sums there. But similar big-
spending contests occurred
in several other states, peaking in 2000 when the national total
spent by high-court candidates rose 61% over 1998; in addi-
tion, interest groups’ “independent spending” hit at least $16
million that year, far more than ever before.10 Since 2000,
although the total sums spent nationally have fallen, in infla-
tion-adjusted terms, from the peak spending in 2000, more
and more individual states have set new records for judicial
campaign spending.  Obviously, the era of quiet judicial elec-
tions has ended, replaced by contests that were “nastier, nois-
ier, and costlier.”11
But significant additional change started in 2004 in
Missouri, which has been famous since 1940 for being the first
state to adopt a “merit” system.  In 2004, for the first time in
decades, a Missouri justice faced organized opposition to his
retention.  Several groups were active against the justice, using
methods like robocalls with a message from Phyllis Schlafly.12
The justice won but the lesson was rich, though it drew almost
no attention:  while the opposition’s grassroots believed the
contest was all about that justice and/or sending a message to
judges generally, savvy observers believed that the opposition
leaders’ actual aim was to increase total turnout of anti-judge
Court Review - Volume 46 119
lost after attacks on her having joined a decision that overturned
a capital sentence, an attack that was a façade in order to open a
vacancy for a new appointment. After she was denied retention,
the state’s governor was asked, “Should a judge look over his
shoulder [when making decisions] about whether they’re going to
be thrown out of office?”  “I hope so,” he answered. See David B.
Frohnmayer, Who’s to Judge?, 58 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9 (1997). See ABA
TASK FORCE REPORT, note 2 supra, at 6 (1998); on the Tennessee
events, see also Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland, Justice in
Peril: The Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and
Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1240 n.
48 (2008).
As for the five states other than Iowa with organized opposition
in 2010:
Alaska Justice Dana Fabe won retention with 55% of the votes
despite the opposition of the Alaska “political arm of the anti-
abortion, pro-traditional marriage Alaska Family Council,” with
funding mainly from the “national Christian group Focus on the
Family.” Voters Retain Fabe as Alaska Supreme Court Justice,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 3, 2010 (available on Westlaw at
2010 WLNR 21953342).
Three Colorado justices were opposed by Clear the Bench
Colorado “for [partisan] rulings on taxes and fees, congressional
redistricting and eminent domain.”  Felisa Cardona, The Colorado
Vote: Judges Retention: Three on Supreme Court Face Effort to
Remove Them, DENVER POST, Nov. 3, 2010 (available on Westlaw at
2010 WLNR 21986437). The Colorado Attorney General, a
Republican, had spoken against the three to a Republican club, see
Lynn Bartels, AG Regrets Court Remark: A Blog Says Suthers Told a
GOP Club He Won’t Vote for Three State Justices, DENVER POST, Jan.
19, 2010 (available on Westlaw at 2010 WLNR 1152505). They
won with 59%, 60%, and 62%. These percentages and the others
in this footnote are from William Raftery, National Center for State
Courts, NOV. 2 JUDICIAL ELECTIONS ROUNDUP, available at
http://www.ncsc.org/Conferences-and-Events/Nov-2-Judicial-
Elections-Roundup.aspx.
In Florida, Justices Jorge Labarga and James E.C. Perry were
opposed but both won, Labarga by “the lowest approval in state
history although that was still 58.9%” and Perry by 61.7%. “With
little or no funding, several single-issue activist groups influenced
a statewide election that normally attracts little interest—and
that’s troubling to those who believe it marks the beginning of a
movement that could shake the foundation of the judiciary. . . .”
The opposition to the Florida justices “focused on one issue”:
they had joined three other justices in keeping off the ballot a
GOP-backed “measure designed to derail federal health care legis-
lation”; the court had found the ballot language confusing. A 29-
second video posted on YouTube.com, using photos of the jus-
tices, said, “Vote out the Obamacare supporters. They voted
against us. Now we can vote against them.”  The ad was made by
a doctor and the executive director of Florida’s chapter of Ron
Paul’s Campaign for Liberty. Another ad similarly posted, by the
Florida Tenth Amendment Center, urged defeating the two who
had denied voters “the right to vote on health care freedom.”  Jane
Musgrave, Florida Judges May Be on Political Hotseat, PALM BEACH
POST, Nov. 13, 2010, available at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/
news/state/florida-judges-may-be-on-political-hot-seat-
1045961.html?printArticle=y. 
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people, hoping their votes
would help win several nonju-
dicial races. And in 2006,
again in Missouri, the voters
defeated a trial judge in Cole
County (home of the state
capital, Jefferson City—about
two-thirds of Missouri’s trial
judges face contestable parti-
san elections); the judge had
been challenged because a
campaign consultant deemed
that judge the most vulnera-
ble of several up for reelection; the consultant had found fund-
ing from an out-of-state deep-pocket judge-hater.13
While 2010 campaigns were particularly difficult for incum-
bents generally, not merely judges, for years hostility to courts
has been active and rising.  The 2010 judicial elections took us
to a new stage, described with unusual clarity, depth, and con-
ciseness by South Dakota’s Chief Justice David Gilbertson:  
. . .  I think events have taken an ominous turn for the
worse. For several years expensive and sometimes
nasty judicial elections have gone on. However they
appear to me to be mostly . . . the trial lawyers and
unions vs. the chamber of commerce and insurance
companies. They were wallet driven. Now the issue
has changed to issues concerning personal beliefs and
lifestyles. [T]he recent results in Iowa show a new
anti-judicial force which is . . . able to portray itself as
the defender of values and rights instead of the judi-
ciary.14
WHAT HAPPENED IN IOWA
We turn now to the 2010 Iowa election. For starters, a blog
posting shortly after the election by a Dr. Richard G. Lee pro-
vides a must-read account about the opposition’s start with
seed money from Newt Gingrich, the opposition’s organiza-
tion, and its activities (plus discussion of several alleged mis-
steps by supporters of the justices).15 Several knowledgeable
Iowans, though not all agreed on every alleged fact in that
posting, do agree that it is generally a full and fascinating pic-
ture. 
In April 2009, a unanimous Iowa Supreme Court decision
had struck down Iowa’s 1998 Defense of Marriage Act in a suit
brought in 2005 by six gay couples who had been denied mar-
riage licenses.16 (The trial judge, who also had ruled for the
plaintiffs, won retention in the 2010 election.)  Turnout was
Iowa’s highest in any non-presidential year, and the votes cast
on retention set a record for Iowa and were near the highest in
any state ever. Normally only a bit more than 60% of Iowa vot-
ers would cast a ballot on whether to retain a justice, but 88%
did so in 2010.17 The justices won only 46% for retention.  In
Iowa’s prior 1,322 retention votes, four trial judges had lost
(otherwise, trial judges had won with majorities ranging from
about 55% to about 75%) but no appellate judges had lost;
appellate judges had averaged more than 70% voting for reten-
tion in all but two elections: 2000 and 2006. 
The campaign spending against the justices totaled almost
In Illinois, Justice Thomas Kilbride (who won with 66%) was
involved in the only big-money  retention contest, with about
$2.5 million spent by his supporters (“plaintiffs’ lawyers, unions
and other interests channeling money through the Illinois
Democratic Party, which has an obvious stake in how the . . . court
comes down in future legal battles over redistricting”), and about
$650,000 by his opponents (including “$150,000 from the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, $180,000 from a group closely aligned
with the National Association of Manufacturers and nearly
$90,000 from the American Tort Reform Association”). Editorial,
Judges and Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010 (available on Westlaw
at 2010 WL 21691000). That court has some history of unusually
partisan action in reviewing redistricting, see Jackson Williams,
Irreconcilable Principles: Law, Politics, and the Illinois Supreme
Court, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 267, 290-91 (1998), and People ex. rel.
Burris v. Ryan, 634 N.E.2d 1066, 1067-68 (Ill. 1994) (Harrison, J.,
dissenting) (charging colleague with changing his vote in a redis-
tricting case after deciding to change parties).
Kilbride, who became chief justice after the election, said this:
“If we are going to allow the courts to be politicized to this degree
. . . it’s going to ruin the court system. We might as well shut down
the third branch.”  John Gramlich, Judges’ Battles Signal a New Era
for Retention Elections, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, p. A8 (available
on Westlaw at 2010 WLNR 25819195).
In Kansas, most notable was a full-page ad run in support of the
four justices up for retention: “Kansas Wins With a Fair and
Impartial Judiciary,” naming the justices, with brief text noting
that they had “passed the demanding review of the independent
Kansas Commission on Judicial Performance. See the
Commission’s positive reviews at [the Commission’s website]. Be
informed before you go to the polls.”  The ad opened with, “We
urge you to vote to retain,” with photographs of three supporters
of the justices:  the current governor, a former governor, and for-
mer United States Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum. The ad ran
in the Wichita Eagle and the Topeka Capitol-Journal and is on the
web at http://www.justiceforkansasinc.com/media-room.
Important in evaluating (and for adapting) that Kansas ad is
that brief as was its text, it referred explicitly to the “positive
reviews” about the justices by the official, independent
Commission on Judicial Performance (established in 2006). 
4. The six states with organized opposition saw these declines in the
percentage vote for retention:  Iowa 27%-28%, Illinois 13%,
Colorado 10%-13%, Kansas 6%-7%, Florida 6%-9%, and Alaska
7%. Data on these retention elections are from the new and won-
derfully exhaustive work by Dr. Albert Klumpp (correspondence
with author, February 2011).
5. Data as of 2004 compiled by National Center for State Courts, see
Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95
GEO. L. J. 1077,1104 (2007).
6. Id. 
7. From 1940 to 1967, ballot propositions to move to “merit” won in
seven states; from 1969 through 1977, there were seven more vic-
tories for merit selection and four defeats; since 1978, there have
been six victories and nine defeats, with a two-victory, six-defeat
score for merit selection from 1987 to date. See AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SOCIETY, CHRONOLOGY OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL










organizations . . . .
chronology_1C233B5DD2692.pdf.
On the past 105 years’ glacial progress (which if continued will
need another 160 years to end contestable elections for appellate
judges and 770 years for trial judges), see Roy A. Schotland,
Introduction: Personal Views, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1361, 1366-67
(2001) (introducing “Call To Action” and papers from the
National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection). In fact, we
might be moving in the other direction: “Back in 1906, Roscoe
Pound, a scholar at Harvard Law School, started a campaign to
have judges appointed. When he spoke, eight in ten American
judges stood for election. Today, the figure is 87%.” The Election of
Judges: Guilty, Your Honour?, THE ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004, at 28-
29; see also My Judge Is a Party Animal, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 1,
2005, at 20. 
“[The recent] loss of reform momentum has led groups like the
[ABA] to seek ways of improving existing modes of selection
rather than transforming them, at least in the short run.” G. Alan
Tarr, The Judicial Branch, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 85, 99-
100 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (footnotes
omitted). How telling it is that in 1988, Professor Tarr wrote of the
movement toward “merit” systems. G. Alan Tarr & Mary Cordelia
Porter, State Supreme Courts in STATE AND NATION 61 (1990). Many
lawyers and good-government advocates have a strong preference
for “merit” systems, but “the evidence supporting [the claims for
its superiority] is largely anecdotal.” Tarr, The Judicial Branch,
supra.
Efforts to end contestable elections have failed for a generation
(except for one Missouri county in 2008, Green County, the state’s
largest jurisdiction that had not already adopted “merit” and
retention). Not only are such efforts running into reality, they
actually impede judicial reform by distracting from feasible steps
that will reduce the problems in contestable elections, e.g. (a)
steps to inform voters about the candidates and the differences
between judges and other elective officials, and (b) establishing
Campaign Conduct Oversight Committees. See notes 32 and 46
infra.
8. William C. Bayne, Lychard’s Candidacy, Ads, Putting Spice into
Justice Race, COMM. APPEAL (Memphis), Oct. 29, 2000, at p. 1
(available on Westlaw at 2000 WLNR 5193408).
9. And campaigns changed. Later one judge wrote (when the
California Judges Association [CJA] surveyed incumbents about
campaigns):  “Having learned my lesson from the 1978 up-rising,
[this time] I hired a campaign manager immediately . . . . I won
easily (63% to 37%) in spite of a libelous brochure put out by my
opponent the week before the election. . . . It is easy for the
Deputy District Attorneys, who have everything to gain and noth-
ing to lose, to oppose an incumbent judge who has everything to
lose.” The CJA held sessions on campaigning. Political consultant
Joseph Cerrell, who, after 1978, worked in several hundred
California judicial contests, said this:  “Our senators have a polit-
ical operation for use in retaliation. For the most past, judges are
standing naked in the political process not knowing what, when
or how to do anything.”  Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’
Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the Emperor’s Clothes
of American Democracy?, 2 J.LAW. & POL’Y 57, 68-69, 71-72 (1985).   
10. Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000:  Change and
Challenge, 3 M.S.U.-D.C.L.L.REV. 849, 850-51 (2001).
$1 million, including more than $900,000 from three out-of-
state organizations:  the National Organization for Marriage
based in Washington, D.C.; the American Family Association’s
AFA Action, Inc. of Tupelo, Mississippi; and the Campaign for
Working Families PAC of Arlington, Virginia. The main in-
state sum spent against the justices was $10,178, by the Iowa
Family Policy Center ACTION. 18
A similar retention contest occurred in Nebraska in 1996,
when out-of-state funds flooded in to defeat one justice who
had written the opinion in a unanimous decision striking
down Nebraska’s term-limits statute.19
Opposition to the justices was led by Bob Vander Plaats,
who had lost two Republican gubernatorial primaries and one
for lieutenant governor.  After losing in a 2010 primary, he put
his full-time effort into the anti-retention campaign.  Although
the opposition funding was almost all from outside Iowa,
unquestionably there was a great deal of active local support;
for example, one of Iowa’s congressmen led a bus tour around
the state.20 One other important aspect of the Iowa opposition
was that “more than 200 churches” actively participated in the
opposition.21
For the justices, $423,767 raised entirely in Iowa was spent
by the Iowa-based Fair Courts for Us Committee.22 That was
one of three groups supporting retention, but “Justice Not
Politics” and “Iowans for Fair Courts” did not spend on direct
advocacy but only on educational efforts.  The group called
Justice Not Politics also spent about $8,000 on such efforts.
The one radio spot supporting the justices is worth noting:
“[Background noise of sports official’s whistling and
stadium crowd stirring:]
“[Voice 1:] And the
flags are flying! Looks
like a questionable call.
I think we are going to
see some fans calling for
these referees’ jobs.
“[Voice 2:] Listen,
we will never agree to every call, but you should not
fire the good referees on just one call. The same is
true of the Iowa Supreme Court. I am Bob Ray,
Republican and former Iowa Governor. The Iowa
Supreme Court has been making solid judgments over
the years. The Court protected Iowa families by
requiring convicted sex offenders to live at least 2,000
ft. away from a school or child care center; protected
Iowa seniors and protected our individual property
rights. Please join me, Bob Ray, in turning over the
ballot and voting yes, yes, yes, to retain the Iowa
Supreme Court. There’s enough politics out there and
we don’t need it in our courts.
“Paid for by Fair Courts for Us.”23
Views of that ad’s effectiveness were divided both before it
ran and after, some people feeling that it branded or came too
close to branding the Varnum decision a “bad call.” 24 The ad
was aired enough to consume most of the funds supporting the
justices.  
From outside Iowa, the justices got no help except for a visit
Views of that ad’s
effectiveness were
divided both
before it ran and
after . . . .
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11. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150
(1988).
12. See Margaret Ebrahim, The Bible Bench, MOTHER JONES, May-June
2006, at 54-57, 81-83. “Many on the religious right felt that the
third branch of government should be as accountable to the pub-
lic as the legislative branch was. . . . ‘There’s nothing the matter
with [judgeships] being political,’ Schlafly told the Kansas City
Star.” Id. at 57.
13. The political consultant said, at a gathering of lawyers and busi-
ness leaders in Kansas City shortly after the election, that “some
of these [anti-judiciary] groups just want a scalp to hang on the
wall.”  Scott Lauck, Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan May Be Best
for Cole County, MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY, Nov. 20, 2006 (avail-
able on LexisNexis). See also John DeMoor, Debate Reveals Rock
’Em, Sock ’Em Future of Judicial Politics, MISSOURI LAWYERS WEEKLY,
May 28, 2007 (available on Westlaw at 2007 WLNR 26581789).
The source of funding was a New York real estate figure chairing
Americans for Limited Government, which also supported
Colorado and Montana ballot propositions to limit judges. See
Lauck, supra; Tim Hoover, National Dollars Find, Defeat Circuit
Judge, KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 4, 2006, at p. A1 (available on
Westlaw at 2006 WLNR 20875926). 
One observer believes that the consultant hoped to scare judges
into hiring political consultants to stave off such attacks in the
future. Other observers believe that the challenge was supported
by major figures in the political branches who were displeased
with recent court decisions and wanted to send a message to the
judiciary.
14. Email to author, November 17, 2010.
15. See Richard G. Lee, Behind the Fall of Iowa’s Judicial Gods, online
posting at “Dallas Blog,” available at http://www.dallasblog.com/
201011231007382/guest-viewpoint/behind-the-fall-of-iowa-s-
judicial-gods.html.
The Los Angeles Times has reported that Gingrich “[l]ast fall 
. . . played a key behind-the-scenes role in an unprecedented—and
successful—campaign to remove three Iowa Supreme Court
judges  . . . helping secure $200,000 in seed money for the effort.
. . . ‘It wouldn’t have happened without Newt,’ said David Lane,
executive director of Iowa for Freedom, the organization that led
the campaign. ‘Newt provided strategic advice and arranged the
initial seed money . . . which is what got everything started.’  The
money came from an anonymous donor whose contribution was
arranged by Gingrich, Lane said. Robert L. Vander Plaats, chief
spokesman for the judicial campaign, said the former speaker pro-
vided key strategic advice.” Tom Hamburger & Matea Gold,
Gingrich Courts the Religious Right, L.A. TIMES, p. 1 (available on
Westlaw at 2011 WLNR 4124524).
That report was followed by two others which said the sum was
$150,000. Tom Witosky, Gingrich Group Gave to Effort Against
Justices, DES MOINES REGISTER, March 16, 2011, at p. A1 (available
on Westlaw at 2011 WLNR 5152390); and AP, Gingrich Funnels
$150K to Iowa Groups That Defeated Justices by Way of Aide’s
Committee, WASH. POST, March 15, 2011. 
16. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). The decision drew
national attention at once, see e.g., Teddy Davis & Ferdous Al-
Faruque, Iowa: The Gay Marriage Mecca?, ABC NEWS, April 3,
2009, available at http.//abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=
7253244&page=1.
and talk by former United
States Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor. In
September, she addressed
“more than 200 elected offi-
cials and guests of the Iowa
Bar Association . . . .”  Praising
Iowa’s judicial-selection sys-
tem, she also made this pow-
erful statement:
Justice [David]
Souter and I both look
at the Court as the one
safe place where a person can have a fair and impartial
hearing . . . and we have to keep that.  [We] have to
address the pressures being applied to that one safe
place . . . to have it where judges are not subject to out-
right retaliation.25
It’s not clear, though, that Justice O’Connor’s effort had any
lasting impact.
Strikingly absent or severely limited were efforts by national
organizations with the mission of supporting judicial indepen-
dence. Four are relevant, the largest by far being the American
Bar Association, but the ABA understandably leaves local
action to state and local bar associations.  And what any state
or local bar will do depends on who happens to be the leader-
ship at the time and whether anyone can be recruited who has
time available and the relevant experience.  The Iowa Bar was
alert to the situation, did come into action, and their action
was substantial, but not more; it aimed entirely at explaining
voting in a retention election. 
Three other national organizations focus fully or largely on
judicial selection systems. Newest is the Colorado-based
Institute to Advance the American Legal System, started in
2006 and working with Justice O’Connor.  In 2010, it gave its
attention to a Nevada ballot proposition to replace their con-
testable election system with a “merit” appointment and reten-
tion system.  Nevada twice before had defeated similar propos-
als, and 2010 saw it defeated a third time, this time with 58%
voting against the proposal.26
The oldest of these three national organizations, the
American Judicature Society, founded in 1913 and by coinci-
dence based in Iowa, is legally barred (as a 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt entity) from election activity, but its regular education
programs included efforts and events in Iowa; how much, if at
all, those programs affected the election seems impossible to
say. Last, the most active of these entities, networked and well
funded (mainly by George Soros’s Open Society Institute), is
Justice at Stake, which has “partnered” with an array of other
organizations such as the ABA, the National Center for State
Courts, the League of Women Voters, the American Judges
Association, and many reform groups. Like the American
Judicature Society, Justice at Stake is barred from election
activity; its president wrote an op-ed about voting in retention
elections, published online in the Denver Post.27
Would the justices and judicial independence have been
aided if more visitors like Justice O’Connor had come to Iowa,






the mission of 
supporting judicial
independence.
For a thorough and learned analysis of the decision, see Todd
Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage and the Ouster of Three
Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2011); see also
Chase D. Anderson, A Quest for Fair and Balanced: The Supreme
Court, State Courts, and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage Review
after Perry, 60 DUKE L.J. 1413, 1431-39 (Of the four states’
supreme court cases, “Only the Iowa court had a developed evi-
dentiary record on which to base its conclusions. . . . The Iowa
court’s opinion contained the strongest reasoning.”). 
17. The extremely high participation in voting on retention was
attributable in part to the fact that the races for Governor and for
U.S. Senator were not at all close, so attention in media coverage
and otherwise focused on the retention contest.
18. All spending data are from the NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN
STATE POLITICS, INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES IN IOWA TOPPLE THREE
HIGH COURT JUSTICES, Jan. 10, 2011, available at http://www.fol-
lowthemoney.org/press/ReportView.
19. See note 3 supra.
20. See Lynda Waddington, Anti-Judge Bus Tour Dwarfed by Pro-
Retention Rally, THE IOWA INDEP., Oct. 28, 2010, available at
http://iowaindependent.com/46337/anti-judge-bus-tour-dwarfed-
by-pro-retention-rally.
21. See Pettys, note 16 supra, at 74. One pastor “has a prayer that he
recites as he campaigns . . ., ‘Dear God, he says, ‘please allow the
IRS to attack my church, so I can take them all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court.’”  Bryan Ray, Iowa Pastor Preaches Politics to Oust
3 Justices Who Backed Gay Marriage, USA TODAY, October 13,
2010. A “Project Jeremiah 2010” pledged free legal support to the
churches, see Jason Hancock, Second Iowa Pastor Takes Aim at
Judges, THE IOWA INDEP., Oct. 7, 2010, available at http://iowa
independent.com/44775/second-iowa-pastor-takes-aim-at-judges. 
22. After the National Institute report (see note 18 supra) on the Iowa
spending, a late contribution raised the Fair Courts’ total by
$6,500. See email to author from Linda Casey of National
Institute, Feb. 15, 2011. 
Almost no funds were raised before mid-October.  The State Bar
contributed $50,000 (10/18); Iowa Academy of Trial Lawyers
$50,000 (mostly 10/20); Polk County Bar Assoc. $13,124 (10/29);
American Bd. of Trial Advocates $5,000 (10/18); Iowa Defense
Counsel Assoc. $5,000 (10/27); AFSCME $25,000 (10/18);
Human Rights Campaign Equality Votes $25,000 (10/25);
Fairness Fund $25,000 (10/13); Midwest Capital Group Inc.
$20,000 (10/18); also, one individual contributed $50,000
(10/12). Information provided author by Fair Courts for Us
Committee; and see Fair Courts’ filings on Independent
Expenditure by an Organization, Iowa Ethics and Campaign
Disclosure Board.
Iowa’s campaign finance disclosure, administered by the Ethics
and Campaign Finance Board, seems a case study in how to frus-
trate any use of such information. For example, the “Independent
Expenditure” reports filed by the Fair Courts committee have
cover pages with total sums that differ substantially from the
accompanying detailed pages; the columns of donors’ names are
mostly unmatchable with the columns of contribution amounts;
many donors are listed without contribution amounts, etc.   
23. Transcribed for this article.
24. The ad was produced hastily because funds became available only
very shortly before the election. In my view, the ad would have
such as former chief justices from other states who might have
drawn upon experience from judicial elections in various
selection systems? Such speakers might produce press cover-
age and meet with many groups in many locations—should
that be tried in a coming election? Experienced observers in
several states say that judges cannot be effective supporters of
other judges; voters are likely to view the effort as self-protec-
tion.  The most effective supporters are likely to be respected
former high officials or other persons who enjoy strong public
regard, like some media stars and the voters’ local members of
the state legislature.  (But former chief justices or justices with
campaign experience might be invaluable sounding boards for
candidates in contests.)
Many state bar associations and others do have “rapid
response” plans and people ready to defend courts when
judges are under inappropriate attack. Looking backward,
ought responses to have been launched in Iowa shortly after
the Varnum decision came under attack?  More to the point,
ought the next similar situation draw more early-response
attention than this one did?
Two post-election gatherings in Iowa have looked back on
the election usefully.  In December, two focus groups met to
discuss the election.  According to one observer’s report:
We heard a lot of “It may have been the ‘right’ deci-
sion based on the Constitution, but I just don’t like it.
So I voted them out.” Repeatedly we saw voters unable
to understand the differences between what judges do
and what non-judicial elective officials do. This basic
civics gap as it relates to the difference between the
three branches of govern-
ment . . . was cavernous. 
Another observer said this: 
[What] may be most
important for us going for-
ward—several expressed a
frustration with the fact
that they didn’t know who
the justices were, how
they became justices, how
they arrived at their deci-
sion, what gave them the right to make the decision,
etc. There appears to be a great desire for more infor-
mation and more education. . . . 
A third observer said that one focus group participant com-
mented along these lines:           
Much as I oppose the court’s decision, I know so lit-
tle about judges that I shouldn’t be allowed to vote on
them.
And in February, at a University of Iowa Law School panel
discussion about the election, Justice Michael Streit, one of the
three denied retention, said that “politicians demanded judges
follow the popular vote, instead of ruling on the law. . . .  They
kept saying it was the ‘will of the people’ but who are these
people?”28 Very differently, Vanderbilt Law School Professor
Brian Fitzpatrick said that “the only question is whose politics
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“We heard a lot




but I just don’t
like it. So I voted
them out.’”
been beyond criticism if only one sentence were changed, replac-
ing  “you should not fire the good referees on just one call,” with
something like this: “We all know that some calls look bad to
some people and look good to other people, but we know we need
referees who are neutral; we can’t rely on any other kind.”
25. Tyler Kingkade, Sandra Day O’Connor Visits, Admires Iowa Court
System, IOWA STATE DAILY, Sept. 8, 2010, available at
http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/article_1a95721e-bb9b-
11df-9116-001cc4c03286.html; and see Dahlia Lithwick, Cheap
Seats: How Sandra Day O’Connor Got Drawn into the Gay-Marriage
Debate in Iowa, SLATE, Nov. 13, 2010, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2267160. 
26. Valerie Miller, Ballot Measures Die on Election Day, LAW VEGAS
BUSINESS PRESS, Nov. 15, 2010. The State Bar president, who had
supported the measure, said, “A lot of work went into this. But
this was such a negative election. Voters said ‘no’ to everything.”
The final result did show support had continued rising: a July poll
found 27%, an October poll found 37%. Doug McMurdo, Question
1, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Oct. 30, 2010. 
Nevada voters had rejected the change in 1972 and 1988. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y, Chronology, note 7 supra. In fact, Nevada’s final
result in 2010 showed more support for changing the selection
system than the last generation had won in other states. Such
changes have been consistently defeated for the last generation.
South Dakota voters in 2004 defeated, two to one, a proposal
to have their trial judges selected in the same “merit”/retention
system as their appellate judges, instead of continuing to run in
contestable nonpartisan elections. (However, since 1982 only 21
of 109 judgeships had been contested.) The trial judges them-
selves had earlier been sharply divided about their selection sys-
tem, but for 2004 were unanimous in favoring the change, and the
legislature was only one vote from unanimity in putting the pro-
posal on the ballot. The opposition was summed up by one city
official:  “This proposal is against Motherhood and Apple Pie, it’s
un-American.” Despite an active campaign supporting the
change, it lost after being opposed in a major speech by James
Dobson, whom the New York Times called “the nation’s most influ-
ential evangelical leader.”  Russell Shorto, What’s Their Real
Problem with Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, 34, 41
Jun. 19, 2005. Dobson was in South Dakota campaigning against
Senator Daschle. A few years earlier, Dobson had discovered at an
Alabama rally for their Chief Justice Roy Moore (active advocate
of the Ten Commandments), what Dobson called “the depth of
popular resentment of liberal court decisions.”  As several sup-
porters of the change said after losing, “the people won’t give up
their vote.”
As in South Dakota, Florida’s appellate judges are in a
“merit”/retention system and here too the trial judges face con-
testable (but rarely contested) nonpartisan elections. In 2000,
Floridians (yes, Virginia, there were other races on the Florida bal-
lot that year), defeated a proposal to put their trial judges in the
same system as their appellate judges. The change was defeated in
every circuit with the affirmative vote averaging 32%, and in every
county with the affirmative averaging 26% (the most favorable
was 39%). The change had been supported by the Florida Bar,
which like the ABA and most state bar associations had been urg-
ing such a system for decades.
are driving the judiciary.
Judges make law and law is
what judges say it is. The
Constitution isn’t clear.
Doctrines are invented by
judges and those aren’t
clear. They reach rulings
based on their opinions. It’s
inevitable.”  The election
was summed up by pan-
elist Kathie Obradovich,
political columnist for the
Des Moines Register:  “[T]he campaign on one side was about
education of merit selection process and about the courts, and
the other side was politics. The politics won. But the conver-
sation needs to keep going forward. . . .”29
SOME OPINIONS BASED ON THE 2010 IOWA
ELECTION
THE ELECTION ITSELF
Let’s begin with some thoughts directly about the Iowa elec-
tion itself.
First, should the justices have campaigned?  They did not,
and most knowledgeable observers have faulted them for this.
But I do not, for two reasons: Implying absolutely no view of
these justices, I stress (as I wrote several years ago) that many
fine judges are not political in any sense—no surprise—and
many of them do not fit comfortably into a political role.30
Study of the “judicial personality” shows, as one would expect,
how different it is from the “political personality.”31 Also, cam-
paigning may have undermined, at least somewhat, the funda-
mental position at stake: that the judges’ job is different from
the jobs of other elected officials.32
Second (and entirely separate) is the question whether it is
appropriate to vote against a retention candidate because of
one decision.  The raison d’etre of retention elections is to
reduce politics in judicial selection or retention.  Whatever the
system of selecting and/or retaining judges, they are account-
able for their neutrality and professionalism; if they are to carry
out the rule of law, they are not to be removed from office for
a decision that is unpopular but, in their view, is called for by
the facts and law as they understand it. 
Never is there more potential for judicial account-
ability being distorted and judicial independence being
jeopardized than when a judge is campaigned against
because of a stand on a single issue or even in a single
case.33
Of course, voters, if empowered to vote on judges either in
contestable elections or on retention, obviously can vote on
whatever grounds they wish.  But power doesn’t equal right-
ness.  Judicial elections, whatever the type, are fundamentally
different from other elections because the judge’s job is so dif-
ferent from nonjudicial elective officials.  The differences are
clear first from the array of state constitutional provisions
about judges—e.g., all elective states give judges terms that are
stunningly longer than any other elected officials’ terms.34 But
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And in 1987 in Ohio, a ballot proposition for change lost two
to one and in 80 of Ohio’s 88 counties, despite more than
$400,000 spent to support it by the State Bar and League of
Women Voters. The opposition included the Democratic and
Republican parties and was funded with over $300,000 from the
Ohio AFL/CIO, who ran TV ads that have been the basic theme in
all these contests over change:  “Don’t let them take away your
vote.”   John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, Strike One, Strike
Two…. The History of and Prospect for Judicial Reform in Ohio,
JUDICATURE, Dec.-Jan. 1992, at 193.                                               
27. Bert Brandenberg, Look at Whole Record of Judges Before Voting,
DENVER POST, posted Oct. 27, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/
guestcommentary/ci_16439027
28. Justice Streit’s “who are these people[?]”goes right to the differ-
ence between election voting on one hand, law on the other. Our
constitutional republic is founded on and functions through three
branches and a specified process of enactment and enforcement of
laws. If the prescribed deliberative, representative, and account-
able process is not followed, we risk replacing law with some peo-
ple’s passions—perhaps widely shared and perhaps not, perhaps
long-lasting and perhaps not.
One of the Federalist Papers’ most memorable statements
addresses precisely this difference: 
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought,
in all governments, and actually will, in all free governments,
ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are par-
ticular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated
by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled
by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for
measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most
ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how
salutary will be the interference of some temperate and
respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided
career and to suspend the blow meditated by the people
against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain
their authority over the public mind?  What bitter anguish
would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their
government had contained so provident a safeguard against
the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might then
have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same
citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next. No.
63 (Madison), ABA Classics Series (2009), at 362-63.
29. Trish Mehaffey, Retention Election Came Down to Politics vs. Law,
EASTERN IOWA NEWS NOW, posted Feb. 3, 2011, http://eastern-
iowanewsnow.com/2011/02/03/retention-election-came-down-to-
politics-vs-law/.
30. However, since the justices were within five percentage points of
being retained, even modest campaigning might well have
changed the result.
Justice Streit (see n. 28 above) said this in February: “ . . . I
think that judges, if they face real opposition, cannot sit back qui-
etly and wait for voters to do what is right. I think they’re going
to have to campaign, and that means . . . to raise money. They’re
going to have to tell people, I will be fair and impartial, but 
please, I need $100,000.”  See DES MOINES REGISTER Staff Blogs,
Ousted Justice: Judges Likely to Need Election Campaigns,
http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2011/02/03/
ousted-justice-judges-likely-to-need-election-campaigns/.
retention elections are not only different, they are unique.35 To
say that it is appropriate for voters in retention elections to toss
out a judge because of a decision, defies the history of the
retention system’s adoption and its design to avoid the advo-
cacy, heat, and range of choice that can come with competing
candidates.36
Let me be explicit that despite my deep disagreement with
those who opposed the Iowa justices’ retention, I respect their
honesty.  They disagreed with one decision that that court had
made, their disagreement was the undeniably clear basis of
their opposition, and they took advantage of an opportunity to
make the justices account for what they had done.  
One cannot deny that voters can use their opportunity to
vote any way they wish.  Nor do I fault advocates and
activists who say that even for judges, elections are a proper
method of accountability.  But it is entirely different for aca-
demics or other supposedly detached observers to endorse
that view.  To ignore the differences between what judges do
and what nonjudicial elective officials do is unthinking or
hyper-simplistic.
Nonjudicial elective officials thrive or lose by their reading
of the support they can secure by adopting positions and
promising to promote them, then by how well they perform in
implementing the promises.  For any judge—even United
States Supreme Court justices—“hot-button” issues are rare
(even at the Supreme Court, only a minute fraction of their
decisions). For most trial judges, such issues are non-existent.
But decades of experience show that when there is organized
opposition to a judge, it is rarely honest. Last year, for example,
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Illinois Supreme Court Justice
Thomas L. Kilbride was
opposed by pro-business inter-
ests unhappy with his voting to
overturn a statute capping med-
ical malpractice damages; but
the opposition’s TV ads focused
on his record in criminal cases
to portray him as “soft on
crime.”37 Similarly, a recent
West Virginia case ended in the
United States Supreme Court
because of the extraordinarily
large independent spending against an incumbent by the presi-
dent of a company with major litigation coming before that
court; that opposition had focused entirely on the incumbent’s
role in a case about a child-abuser.38 In cases like those, it may
well be that most voters in fact agreed with the  decisions that
actually led to the incumbent’s  being opposed, but were misled
by sophisticated campaigning that relied on selling what was
easy to sell.  One of our wisest judges summarized the reality of
judicial elections:  
Every judge’s campaign slogan, in advertisements
and on billboards, is some variation of “tough on
crime.” The liberal candidate is the one who advertises:
“Tough but fair.”  Television campaigns have featured
judges in their robes slamming shut a prison cell door.39
To oppose a judge because of her or his decisions and then









The new justices appointed in 2011 to fill the three vacancies
will campaign in 2012.  Jens Manuel Krogstad, New Justices Will
Campaign When Facing Retention Vote, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar.
24, 2011.  “The justices said that they prefer not to campaign . . .
but that they learned a lesson from last fall’s successful campaign
that ousted three justices. . . .  [Justice] Waterman said he didn’t
like seeing the retention vote and selection process become politi-
cized with outside money.  However, he said the events provided
a good springboard to discuss the importance of the judiciary.”
31. For the 1998 study by the presiding judge of the San Bernardino
trial courts, see my Six Fatal Flaws, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 233, 242-
45 (2008) (“Elective Campaigns and the Judicial Pool”).
32. For a powerful example of voter-aimed material that “It’s
Simple–Judicial Elections are Different,” see the Maryland Judicial
Campaign Conduct Committee’s brochure, available at
http://www.mdjccc.org/index/html.  
Consider how different is the judge’s job:
[O]ther elected officials are open to meeting—at any time
and openly or privately—their constituents or anyone who
may be affected by their action in pending or future matters,
but judges are not similarly open; nonjudicial candidates [are
free to] seek support by making promises about how they
will perform; [o]ther elected officials are advocates, free to
cultivate and reward support by working with their support-
ers to advance shared goals; other elected officials pledge to
change law, and if elected they often work unreservedly
toward change; other elected officials participate in diverse
and usually large multi-member bodies; other elected incum-
bents build up support through “constituent casework,”
patronage, securing benefits for communities, etc.; almost all
other elected officials face challenges in every election; [and
last, fundraising by judicial candidates is uniquely con-
strained]. Robert M. O’Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent
First Amendment Rulings, 34 IND. L. REV. 701, 716-17 (2002). 
Reflecting such differences, “The judicial role is most likely
more constrained by normative expectations than any other in
American politics.”  James Gibson, in the latest of his important
studies on the effect of judicial campaigns on the legitimacy of
courts, Judges, Elections, and the American Mass Public (forthcom-
ing), at 8.
33. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, see note 2 supra, at 6.
34. Conference of Chief Justices, amicus brief  in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. Kelly, 122 S.Ct. 643, at 6 (2002). 
35. Indeed, a strong argument has been made that a requirement of
“elections” is not satisfied unless there can be competing candi-
dates. Brian Fitzpatrick, Election as Appointment: The Tennessee
Plan Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REV. 473 (2008).
36. Judge Duane Benton of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, who
speaks with the special authority of having been on Missouri’s
high court, described retention elections this way:  
“The strongest advocates of retention elections intended
that they would be nearly meaningless. [He then quoted a
1980 article that retention elections] were designed to allow
qualified judges to serve long terms with only a modest
amount of direct accountability. Indeed, those who devel-
oped the concept preferred life tenure, but they acquiesced
to political realities and allowed the public an opportunity to
remove judges in extreme circumstances. Clearly removal
campaign with attacks based on
unrelated and seriously mis-
leading claims, dishonors the
election process and distorts
accountability.  
A third and last opinion is
about whether the supporters
of the justices should have
relied on defending “fair and
impartial courts” or should
have also defended the decision
on gay marriage.  Organizations as well as individuals have
strong and conflicting views about what message should be
used.  My own view is that both messages should be pressed
(probably by different groups or advocates) because the mes-
sages will draw different supporters.  As the late Henry Hyde,
a long-time Congressman from Illinois, once said, “Politics is a
game of addition.  You start with your followers and bring in
new ones, constantly broadening the circle . . . .”40
WHAT OF IT? THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTION  
One distinguished  professor of constitutional law has sug-
gested that this Iowa experience may have no lasting negative
impact on the rule of law: 
What happened in Iowa cannot help but give a tem-
porary chill to other courts when faced with such a
highly charged political issue as gay marriage. . . .  But
this sort of thing happens episodically, creates a stir and
then dies down.   Some accountability is not a bad idea.
The rule of law is not in danger because of this one
election. 41
That is an optimistic view, but with all respect, it is mis-
leadingly superficial.  First, it fails to note that the Iowa event
has several different impacts: one, as noted, is a likely chilling
effect on future decisions in many sates; another is the proba-
bility, as I note below, of a significant increase in challenges to
judges in many states and in all kinds of elections; and last is
this:  At least until the Iowa event’s impacts do “die down,” we
will suffer from some indeterminate number of fine lawyers
who would make fine judges, and fine judges who are coming
up for reelection or retention, who decide against being on the
bench because of the job’s newly increased insecurity.   Second,
while of course “[t]he rule of law is not in danger because of
this one election,” neither did one presidential assassination
put American politics in danger.  But even if some disasters die
down after brief stirs, several reasons suggest that the Iowa
event is likely to have lasting impact.  One cannot predict just
how much, but it will be enough to matter, enough to cause
substantial concern.42
Because: 
1. Judicial elections (until a few in recent years) were always
either completely quiet or, even if lively, had no impact on
other elections.  Starting with Missouri’s 2004 challenge to
a justice’s retention, where much of the motivation was to
increase turnout in nonjudicial elections, the tail has
begun to wag the dog.  That is, judicial elections become
lively because they can be used as a tool to affect nonjudi-




one . . . is a likely
chilling effect on
future decisions in
many states . . . .
was perceived as the exception, not the rule.’” Benton,
Comments on the White, Caufield & Tarr Articles, 74 MO. L.
REV. 667, 669 (2009).
37. “Kilbride was portrayed as soft on crime in visceral radio ads that
featured actors portraying rapists and murderers. . . . [T]he
acknowledged aim of the Illinois Civic Justice League was to
dump a judge it sees as unwilling to stop large jury awards given
to plaintiffs in malpractice and other negligence lawsuits.”
Monique Garcia, State Supreme Court Justice Wins Retention Battle,
CHI. TRIB.,Nov. 2, 2010.
38. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
39. Hans A. Linde, Comment, Elective Judges: Some Comparative
Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 2000 (1988). For examples of
judicial candidates’ “tough on crime” ads, see Task Force on
Selecting State Ct. Judges, Citizens for Indep. Cts., Choosing
Justice: Reforming the Selection of State Judges, in UNCERTAIN
JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA’S COURTS 77, 101-02 (2000).
40. Peggy Noonan, Where the Leaders Are, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Feb. 18,
2011.
41. Mark Curriden, Judging the Judges, 97 ABA. J. 56, 58 (2011) (quot-
ing NYU professor Barry Friedman). 
The facile “Some accountability is not a bad idea” is foolish.
“Accountability” on a lightning-rod issue arises only if the judge
voted against the preference of people able to organize and secure
funding. This turns justice into gambling with one side holding a
marked deck. Consider, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding a public school pupil’s
right to refuse, on religious grounds, to salute the flag and over-
ruling a contrary 1940 decision); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (upholding a right to counsel in felony trials and over-
ruling a contrary 1942 decision).
42. Whether popular reactions against a few highly visible decisions
will remain episodic, or instead will fuel long-standing efforts to
politicize judicial elections, I cannot predict. Examples of such
efforts in recent years:  Colorado voters rejected an effort to
impose term limits on judges. And in Kansas, local voters rejected
efforts to return to contestable elections by replacing
“merit”/retention systems, and the legislature has rejected efforts
to change the statewide “merit”/retention system for appellate
judges. 
As of March 8, 2011, “legislation has been introduced in at least
eight states to radically restructure or eliminate long-standing
merit selection systems.”  Interestingly, in Iowa “a host” of bills
ended in committee, “thanks in part to the vocal opposition of a
broadly-based bipartisan coalition of legal and non-legal organiza-
tions.”  American Judicature Society press release, Mar. 8, 2011.
43. This does not mean that people like Vander Plaats are taking over
the state party. In fact, Governor Branstad’s appointments to fill
the three vacancies created by the election are traditional for Iowa:
two experienced judges and one notable practitioner, all with rep-
utations for ability and neutrality. See Jerry Krogstad, Branstad’s
Supreme Court Choices, DES MOINES REGISTER, Feb. 23, 2011.
44. For a full-page profile of Vander Plaats, see Kerry Howley, The
Pizza and the Power, NYTIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 3, 2011. He is now
a full-time executive of the FAMiLY LEADER (“they’ve consigned
the ‘I’ to lowercase to emphasize the individual’s submission
before God,” id.), “a social conservative advocacy group started
this week in Iowa,” which is sponsoring presidential candidate
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cial races.  That seems bound to recur.  
2. A second incentive to challenge judges emerged in
Missouri’s 2006 challenge to a trial judge:  the combina-
tion of a consultant eager for a client, with even a single
deep-pocket individual ready to crusade against judges.
Some combination of a consultant and a deep pocket
seems bound to recur.  
3. Iowa brings a new incentive:  any politician who is either
anti-judiciary, or willing to be, can secure enough support
that if the effort wins or almost wins, she or he gains.
Vander Plaats’ having led the Iowa effort to such success
has made him a major figure, probably the state’s number
three Republican after Governor Terry E. Branstad and
Senator Chuck Grassley.43 There are bound to be copyists,
even if Vander Plaats fails in his current effort to sell a
book about Iowa’s 2010 event.44
WHAT TO DO? STEPS TO TAKE TO REDUCE THE
LIKELIHOOD OF MORE ATTACKS ON JUDGES 
What to do? Here, I merely list a few key possibilities
worth consideration:
Outreach, which should be year-in, year-out and should
include “audience multipliers” like Access TV, local radio, and
local newspaper coverage.45
Bench/Bar/Media meetings at least annually, as well as
columns in local newspapers by chief justices and/or other jus-
tices.
Campaign Conduct Committees—unofficial and with mem-
bers who are representative, diverse, and distinguished.46
Readiness of the Bar and
other supporters of fair and
impartial courts, especially
including the general coun-
sels of key organizations and
corporations.
One notable observer of
the Iowa events said that part
of the reason it happened was
that it was so hard to know
the opposition was so substantial.  When I mentioned that to
a state chief justice who is unusually savvy about politics, he
was dismissive, saying that to wait until one knows is to lose,
and that the only sound course is to be ready, working con-
stantly to help the public understand the role of the courts and
how different is the judges’ job from the jobs of other elected
officials.
The impacts of an event like the Iowa voters’ rejection of
their justices are of three types, all severely harmful.  I do not
prioritize among these, but: 
1. Judges everywhere (not only in elective states, but any
judge who is not nearing the end of her or his career) will
be unable to avoid thinking about possible popular reac-
tions, if they have before them a high-visibility case or
issue.47
2. Sitting judges, as well as lawyers willing to serve on the
bench and who would be fine judges, will be more likely
to stop or avoid such service because of the unpredictable
insecurity that is too likely to flow from their doing their
The impacts of an
event like the Iowa
voters’ rejection of
their justices are of
three types, all
severely harmful.
forums in the coming months in which “several prospective can-
didates have agreed . . . to participate . . . .”  Jeff Zeleny,
Conservative Gathering to Test G.O.P. Hopefuls, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2011.
45. The Florida Bar has outstanding materials (and training materials)
for lawyers’ and judges’ outreach presentations, see the
Benchmarks Program of the Judicial Independence Committee of
the Florida Bar, http://www.floridabar.org/judicialindependence.
The ABA also has excellent materials available, see ABA Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence’s Resource Kit on Fair and
Impartial Courts, available at: http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/justice_center/judicial_independence/resources/resource_
kit_on_fair_impartial_courts_lub.html. 
For a remarkable picture of the number and types of outreach
programs, see the more than 50-page annual COMMUNITY
OUTREACH PROGRAMS AND CONTACTS: SUPERIOR COURTS, published
by California’s Administrative Office of the Courts.
Surely illuminating is the fact that the Iowa court has just
begun its first-ever outreach efforts. See William Petroski, State’s
Justices to Take to the Radio Airwaves, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar.
15, 2011; and see Krogstad, n. 30 supra (“[T]he justices will for
the first time travel around the state to hear arguments.”).
46. See David Rottman, Conduct and its Oversight in Judicial Elections:
Can Friendly Persuasion Outperform the Power to Regulate?, 21
GEO. J. LEG. ETH. 1295 (2008); and see the National Center for
State Courts’ website on such committees, http://www.judicial
campaignoversight.org.
47. “You cannot forget the fact that you have a crocodile in your bath-
tub,” said former California Justice Otto Kaus, referring to con-
troversial cases at election time. “You keep wondering whether
you’re letting yourself be influenced, and you do not know. You do
not know yourself that well.”  D. Morain, Kaus to Retire from State
Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1985. “Should a judge look over
his shoulder [when making decisions] about whether they’re
going to be thrown out of office?  I hope so,” asserted Tennessee’s
Governor after helping to deny retention to Justice Penny White
in 1996. That quotation is the very opening of David B.
Frohnmayer [long-time elected Attorney General of Oregon and
then president of the University of Oregon], Who’s To Judge?, 58
OR. SR. B. BULL. 9, 9 (1997).
48. We cannot overemphasize that the entire point of work on judicial
selection is to protect and promote the suitability of the lawyers
who will enter and stay on the bench. There will never be a short-
age of lawyers eager to be judges, but the size and caliber of the
pool changes. To go on the bench already involves a greater—and
steadily increasing—loss of income. “Judges’ Pay: A Chasm Far
Worse Than Realized, and Worsening,” the title of my 2007 arti-
cle, 82 IND. L.J. 1273, has been downloaded incomparably more
than any other product of my 26 years’ work on judicial elections
and selection. 
49. In my view, whether the worst impact of the Iowa event will be
what it does to affect who seeks judgeships, or what it does to
reduce judges’ protection of constitutional rights in unpopular
matters, is hard to predict. But which is worst doesn’t matter:
both are destructive departures from our constitutional order.
50. I must confess error in being focused on the election and failing to
think about other developments now doing severe damage to our
justice system. Iowa’s new Chief Justice Mark Cady, in his State of
the Judiciary Address in January, discussed two topics:  the recent
election and the role of courts in constitutional review, and the
Iowa courts’ recent budget cuts. On the latter, he included this:
“In addition, our work has grown in the past few years
as a direct result of cuts in services for treating abused and
neglected children and troubled youths. The following
observations of Juvenile Court Officer Paul Thompson of
Marshall County best describe this situation: 
“The front end kids are no longer being served, or if they
are, not as well. We . . . get these kids later when their prob-
lems are more firmly entrenched. . . . The schools and the
police look to us for help and we are unable to provide much
assistance due to the lack of manpower and funds. Due to
funding problems, kids sit in detention or shelter way too
long while waiting for appropriate residential treatment. . . .
[I]t seems like we are having less success when they come
back from placement. The system is certainly broken . . .
[and] the long term effects will show up years down the
road.”  (Jan. 12, 2011), at 5.
51. Text at note 9 supra. 
job.48 And though insecurity will not worry many of the
best people, they will be worse than worried by the likeli-
hood that their colleagues will be unduly concerned about
possible public reactions to high-visibility decisions.  One
chief justice said this of the Iowa election impact:  “[T]his
may be the most significant and long term damage from
the election. There is no way to gauge how many attor-
neys decide to ‘pass’ on the judicial career because of
this.”49
3. Courts will be less able to serve in the indispensable man-
ner in which they have served since we adopted our con-
stitutions—as the bodies that are as insulated from public
passions as we can make them, to review the acts by offi-
cials in other branches in order to assure protection of
individual rights and the rule of law. 50
Although I do predict that the Iowa election is likely to
mean more trouble in judicial elections, this is not predicting
more defeats.  Just as in California after the 1978 challenges to
trial judges,51 there is every reason to believe that justices,
judges, and their supporters will be more ready to meet (and
head off) challenges.  A hallmark of judicial excellence is delib-
erativeness, but that doesn’t include unresponsiveness.
Roy A. Schotland is an emeritus professor at the
Georgetown Law Center, where he has taught
election law, administrative law, and constitu-
tional law. He has coauthored five amicus briefs
for the Conference of Chief Justices, including in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536
U.S. 765 (2002), and in Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). One
commentator has cited the amicus brief Schotland helped to draft
in Caperton as “the amicus brief that seems to have carried the
most weight.” See Kenneth L. Karst, Caperton’s Amici, 33 Seattle
U. L. Rev. 633, 649-54 (2010).
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Judge Denlow gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his law clerk,
Janelle Skaloud. 
Footnotes 
1. Morton Denlow, Breaking Impasses In Settlement Conferences:  Five
Techniques for Resolution, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2000, at 4. Once you get
the case settled, of course, you also need to make sure the settle-
ment is sufficiently detailed and documented to hold up. For tips
on that process, see Morton Denlow, Concluding a Successful
Settlement Conference:  It Ain’t Over Till It’s Over, CT. REV., Fall
2002, at 14.
Judicial settlement conferences present novel challenges tojudges in assisting parties to settle their dispute ratherthan continue to litigate. Often, parties come to the table
with cases that have festered for long periods of time and at
great expense. In many instances, the judge faces the particu-
lar challenge of overcoming impasses that frequently occur
during the  negotiations. 
Impasses arise often, and for a variety of reasons. Each side
may have genuine differences in their evaluations of the mer-
its that cause them to demand more or offer less, preventing a
meeting of the minds. Strong emotions or overly aggressive
negotiation strategies may impede a settlement. An impasse
may also arise due to a multiplicity of issues requiring resolu-
tion, or numerous parties who must all agree. 
A successful settlement judge must employ creative
approaches to bring about a resolution, particularly when the
negotiations appear at a dead end. The judge should be able to
help the parties break through impasses with a process sugges-
tion, additional information, or a settlement recommendation.
Even if the parties appear completely deadlocked, a judge can
reach into a toolbox of techniques to overcome the obstacle
before everyone simply walks away from the table. Judges
should therefore have a number of useful impasse-breaking
techniques at their disposal. 
I previously wrote an article in which I described five such
techniques:  (1) creating a range; (2) recommending a specific
number; (3) splitting the difference; (4) clarifying objective
facts; and (5) setting firm deadlines.1 This article describes
seven more tried-and-true impasse-breaking techniques that
judges may add to their settlement arsenal. 
TECHNIQUE #1:  IDENTIFY MULTIPLE ISSUES AND SEEK
RESOLUTION DURING THE INITIAL JOINT SESSION
Some cases involve the sole question of how much money
needs to change hands in order to settle along with a standard
general release. However, in complicated cases involving more
than just a dollar amount, all relevant issues should be out on
the table early in the process. This is a proactive strategy a
judge can use to avoid later surprises that could cause the
negotiations to fall apart. 
Settlement negotiations that appear to be going well can
suddenly derail upon the late introduction of a “deal breaker”
issue not previously discussed. Thus, parties should work
together early in the process to identify each issue they need to
resolve in order to settle. I generally do this in an initial joint
session before I begin individual caucuses with each side. In
addition, I endeavor to prioritize and resolve some of the issues
in the joint session before caucusing separately. The following
case study provides an example of how to implement this tech-
nique. 
CASE STUDY 1:  A TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CASE
In a recent case, two parties were embroiled in a trademark
dispute over who could use the name associated with a busi-
ness from which both sides came into existence. Although the
defendant had the right to use the name for commercial pur-
poses, the plaintiff retained the right to use it for its nonprofit
research and educational pursuits. Concerned the defendant
had branched out and was using the name in the education
arena, the plaintiff brought suit seeking injunctive relief and
monetary damages. 
After reading the parties’ settlement demand and offer let-
ters, which I require parties to exchange before the settlement
conference, I could see that multiple issues were at play. In
preparation for the conference, I set up a display board in the
courtroom. After initial opening statements in which both par-
ties laid out their concerns and positions, I requested that the
parties identify all of the outstanding issues.
As the parties identified each issue, my law clerk wrote
them on the board for a visual reference. The plaintiff began by
listing its specific goals, and the defendant added areas of con-
cern it wanted to address—particularly when and how it could
use the name to educate customers about how to use its com-
mercial products. 
After the list of issues was formulated, I kept the parties
together in the joint session and explained the following
ground rules. We would proceed through the issues one at a
time with the understanding that there was no agreement on
any one issue unless there was an agreement on all. I encour-
aged the parties to show flexibility where they could and to
hold firm where the issue was of particular importance to
them. I encouraged them to reciprocate movement wherever
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possible. I then went through the issues one by one, inten-
tionally starting with the “easiest” issue first and working up
to the most difficult in order to create settlement momentum.
I asked the parties to explain their concerns on each issue and
to see if we could find a tentative agreement. 
We quickly learned that the defendant was willing to con-
cede one of the issues, which involved assigning to the plain-
tiff an internet domain name it was no longer using. We also
reached tentative resolutions on four other less significant
points. It then became apparent that the remaining issues
would not be resolved until the future use of the trademarked
name was addressed.
At that point, I began the separate caucus process with each
side. Since the parties had prioritized their concerns, I was able
to hone in on the scope of the name use because I could see it
would be the linchpin of the agreement. After several rounds
of caucusing with each party separately, a consensus was
reached defining the boundaries of the name usage. 
I then brought the parties back together to address the
remaining issues, which, for the most part, fell into place
because the most important question had been resolved. The
defendant made concessions on steps they would take to
change the name associated with their educational services,
and the plaintiff was able to give up on its more unrealistic
goals, including the physical relocation of the defendant’s edu-
cational facility. At the end of the day, with the non-monetary
issues resolved, the case settled with no exchange of money
between the parties. 
An impasse was avoided, in part, by the momentum created
in listing and resolving smaller issues in the opening joint ses-
sion. By adopting the ground rule of no binding agreement on
any one issue, unless all issues were resolved, parties could
show flexibility while still preserving control over the final
outcome. This method can also save time by avoiding separate
caucuses on every issue.
The preceding example illustrates some of the advantages of
this technique. First, it serves the basic purpose of organizing
the negotiations and avoiding confusion when multiple issues
are being discussed. Second, it ensures that negotiations will
not fall apart by one side raising a new issue mid-conference.
This approach helps in avoiding a situation where parties agree
on a monetary settlement amount only to go back to the draw-
ing board after the introduction of a term not previously dis-
cussed, such as confidentiality or the resolution of an out-
standing third-party lien. 
Third, it forces the parties to work together with the knowl-
edge that they have no final agreement until they have agreed
on all issues. Each side will then need to determine what is
really important to them, and where they can show flexibility.
This also helps me figure out at the outset where the biggest
areas of contention exist. Fourth, it has the potential to create
momentum that will carry the negotiations forward. When the
parties see the process working, they gain confidence that they
can truly reach a resolution. 
This technique will not be
appropriate for every case. But
when the parties must resolve
multiple issues in order to set-
tle, it is the perfect place to
start.




A settlement database is a tool a court can develop by com-
piling information prepared by judges following successful set-
tlement conferences. The database should detail the types of
cases that frequently come in for settlement conferences and
the settlement amounts, and should add some factual informa-
tion while still preserving the parties’ confidentiality. I have
previously written about how to develop a settlement data-
base.2
I keep a binder of compiled settlement conference statistics
on hand in my chambers. This binder contains information
concerning settlements reached before the magistrate judges in
our court in employment discrimination, civil rights, intellec-
tual property, personal injury, and consumer fraud cases.
As an impasse-breaking technique, the settlement database
can be useful in a variety of situations. First, parties are often
unrealistic as to the amount they expect to realize in a settle-
ment. They may fail to understand that, even on a good day,
they cannot recover through settlement what they might hope
to receive if they won at trial. Parties who are emotional and feel
strongly about the merits may find it difficult to take an objec-
tive, reasonable view of the case. In these instances, a review of
the settlement database can provide them a realistic view of
what others in similar cases have attained through settlement.
The database can also be helpful to less experienced attor-
neys or judges who will benefit from guidance based on other
settlements. When I perceive an attorney is hesitating because
he is uncertain whether to advise his client to offer more or
take less, I furnish the binder in order to provide some per-
spective. Seeing how other cases have settled gives the attorney
an idea of an appropriate ballpark, even though the individual
circumstances of the case will dictate the ultimate number. The
attorney not only learns what a fair settlement may look like,
but also obtains peace of mind that his client’s settlement is
appropriate. 
Finally, the database can provide comfort to one or both
parties that their settlement is in a realistic range. A defendant
may want to settle, but be concerned that he is being taken to
the cleaners. Likewise, a plaintiff may feel she is giving in too
soon by agreeing to a lower number than she expected to
receive. By consulting a compilation of similar case settle-
ments, the parties can walk away feeling they made a fair and
reasonable deal. 
The settlement database is most effective when the court-
[T]he database 
can provide 
comfort to one 
or both parties
that their 
settlement is in 
a realistic range.
2. Morton Denlow, Judicial Settlement Databases:  Development and
Uses, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2004, at 19.
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house has a large volume of
similar-type cases, and then
provides a useful point of
comparison. In the federal
courts, employment and civil
rights cases are currently the
most common cases filed.
Since less than 2% of all cases
go to trial, a settlement data-
base can be more useful than a
jury verdict reporter. In state courts, the database may be
appropriate in personal injury and other types of cases that
contain similar characteristics. Furthermore, cold hard data
will often be more persuasive than the urging from an attorney
or even a recommendation from the judge. 
TECHNIQUE #3:  BRING CLIENTS TOGETHER WITHOUT
COUNSEL (BUT WITH COUNSEL’S PERMISSION)
On occasion, attorneys may hinder rather than help the
progress of a settlement conference. This may be a result of
stubborn posturing by the attorney in order to impress the
client. In other cases, the issue of large attorney’s fees invested
to date and prospective fees going forward may be the impedi-
ment to reaching a resolution. Occasionally, personality con-
flicts have developed between opposing counsel that impede
settlement. These issues may not lend themselves to produc-
tive discussions in the presence of counsel. 
When the attorneys are the problem, and not part of the
solution, I cautiously recommend taking them out of the equa-
tion temporarily to see if the parties can work out their differ-
ences in a meeting alone or with me. I use this only as a last
resort when I perceive the parties truly want to settle, but are
hampered by the attorneys’ involvement. I never use this tech-
nique without first obtaining the permission of both counsel
and explaining that the discussions might be more fruitful if
the parties can interact directly.
This strategy has generally been effective in situations
where the parties had a fairly good relationship prior to the liti-
gation. In commercial disputes, for example, the parties may
have a preexisting business relationship that they can repair as
part of a deal. Where attorney’s fees are the impediment, tak-
ing the attorneys out of the picture leaves the parties free to
lament the legal expenses they are both incurring. The follow-
ing case study demonstrates the effective use of this technique.  
CASE STUDY 2:  A COMMISSION DISPUTE 
In a lawsuit for unpaid commissions by a former salesman
against his ex-employer, I discovered that the salesman and the
company’s owner had a long and close personal relationship
and this was a dispute between two old friends. The company’s
business was tottering, was contesting the plaintiff’s entitle-
ment to certain commissions, and, at that time, lacked the abil-
ity to pay. The lawyers were running up fees with no end in
sight and had developed a great dislike for one another.
I suggested the possibility of meeting separately with the
clients, and the attorneys agreed. I then began the separate ses-
sion by asking the clients to tell me about their relationship.
They each discussed how troubled they were that this dispute
had hurt their friendship and after a while they worked out a
settlement that called for payments over time. More important,
they walked out as friends. 
TECHNIQUE #4:  CALL UPON A LAW CLERK/EXTERN
JURY
When I conduct settlement conferences, I typically invite
my law clerk, courtroom deputy, and law student externs to sit
in and observe the proceedings. This provides them a valuable
learning experience, and I can call upon them for their reac-
tions when I feel it would be helpful for one or both parties to
receive feedback on what has been presented. I encourage the
“jury” to give their honest responses in order to reflect a neu-
tral perspective back to the parties. Generally, this helps the
parties see their case as an outsider would, not as someone
who has been personally embroiled in it for months or years.
In some cases, the “jury” might even raise a consideration that
had not previously been discussed and can help the negotia-
tion progress.    
This technique is most useful in cases that will be tried in
front of a jury, if not settled. When one or both sides appear
overly passionate about their case, perhaps out of proportion
to its merits, third-party feedback can provide much-needed
perspective. By using my staff, I preserve my neutrality and
avoid becoming evaluative too early. If the plaintiff is refusing
to back down, the jury might point out that, while they under-
stand the plaintiff feels wronged, the evidence is weak and the
defendant has a strong position to rebut the plaintiff’s claims.
In other scenarios, the extent of the damages a plaintiff is seek-
ing may be unrealistic, even if she could win on the liability
issue. Likewise, a defendant who feels he has a “slam dunk”
case might be surprised to hear its weaknesses, or to hear that
the plaintiff would likely make a very sympathetic witness in
front of a jury.
The “jury” need not limit its reactions to how they perceive
the merits of the case. In a settlement conference, unlike more
formal court proceedings, the discussion will often turn to
what is really going on behind the scenes. It may come out that
the plaintiff is tired of litigating and just wants to put the
whole experience behind him. Or the defendant might need to
resolve the issue to move forward in her business. The “jury”
can reflect the issues that are the driving factors for the parties,
and can encourage the parties to consider the economic and
emotional concerns in deciding to make a move toward settle-
ment. The use of your staff as a “jury” can provide a big assist
towards bringing about settlement.
TECHNIQUE #5:  ENCOURAGE PARTIES TO “LOOK
FORWARD, NOT BACKWARDS”
This technique is a small but significant way to redirect set-
tlement discussions when the parties have reached a stalemate.
When one or both sides are hanging on to anger or hurt feel-
ings over the events surrounding the litigation, they may have
a hard time compromising at a number that does not feel “fair”
to them. In addition, parties who have spent a lot of money in
the case may have a hard time facing the prospect of settling at
a “loss.”  Even when a party has stated he wants to settle, he
may continue to bring up these grievances that impede the
negotiation process.   
In those instances, I ask the parties if dwelling on the past
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is really the most productive way for them to move forward.
The parties need to consider what they can hope to gain going
forward versus what it will cost them to continue litigating. If
they can truly look forward and still think litigation is the best
route, then it may not be the right time for the case to settle.
However, in the majority of cases, parties forced to consider
the future will conclude that closure is the best thing.  
For most plaintiffs, the question will turn on whether they
have the time, energy, and money to continue the litigation
process. They also need to consider the risks involved in fac-
ing dispositive motions and trial. A major factor will often be
whether settlement will net them more in the long run than
continuing to litigate. They must conduct an honest evaluation
of what it will cost to continue pursuing the case and whether
it is worth their while to do so. Likewise, defendants must also
consider what it will cost them to move forward in the litiga-
tion, despite what they may already have spent. Although the
defendant may be inclined to dwell on money already put into
the case, she must realize that those costs will only mount as
the case goes on. I sometimes tell the defendant that settlement
is like buying an insurance policy—they protect themselves
from the possibility of being hit with a judgment, their own
attorney’s fees and costs, and potentially the fees and costs of
the other side.   
Focusing the parties on the future is an effective impasse-
breaking technique with few drawbacks. More often than not,
one or both parties at the table will need to let go of past events
in order to settle. A change of perspective can go a long way in
helping them do that. If a party is still wavering, I tell them to
mark their calendars a year from the date of settlement, and to
write me a letter if they have any regrets at that time about set-
tling. I tell them that in all my years conducting settlement
conferences, I have never received a letter from a party regret-
ting a settlement. On the other hand, I have seen quite a few
parties who later regretted not having settled when the oppor-
tunity presented itself.
TECHNIQUE #6:  DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
Even when parties have made significant progress toward
settlement and the end is in sight, they may struggle with who
should make the last move to bring the negotiations to a close.
One or both sides may feel they have already given up too
much and may stubbornly refuse to move any further. In these
situations, a judge should take care not to become too wrapped
up in whether the settlement will be a “win” or “loss” for her
own record. As a neutral, the judge does not have a stake in the
outcome, and thus can step back from the situation. I often say
to a party who refuses to make the final move that if they want
to shoot themselves in the foot, I am not here to stop them.
Sometimes I will tell them that I did not bring my checkbook
that day, so it is going to be up to them to make something
happen. This approach acts as a reality check when a party is
confronted with the thought that if they walk away, all the
progress they made could be for naught.    
This technique is most appropriate in situations where the
parties are left with a relatively minor monetary difference that
they refuse to compromise. I often see cases where the parties
start out at hundreds of thousands of dollars apart, and then
negotiate down to a few thousand apart and become stuck.
This issue also presents itself
in cases with multiple issues
where the major problem
areas have been resolved, but
the parties are hung up on a
minor issue. If all sides are
serious about settlement,
rarely will they let so much
progress go to waste when the
hardest work has already been
done. Acting indifferent to
whether parties settle can be a powerful motivator for the par-
ties to act to bring the deal to a close. 
TECHNIQUE #7:  ONE SIDE GIVES A DIRECT
“ULTIMATUM” WHERE A SMALL DIFFERENCE REMAINS
Generally, I discourage “final offers” or ultimatums in set-
tlement conferences, because it can have the effect of bringing
negotiations to a halt. In my experience, parties using phrases
such as “that’s my bottom line” or “that’s my top dollar” back
themselves into a corner when in reality it may take some fur-
ther movement to settle the case. They effectively put them-
selves in the position of either backing down from their
emphatic statement or ending the negotiation process alto-
gether.     
However, in some limited occasions where the parties are
extremely close but neither side will budge, it may be appro-
priate for one side to give an ultimatum after other impasse-
breaking techniques have been attempted. This technique
should not be used prematurely; rather, only when it has
become clear that one side is truly ready to walk away from the
table. When that happens, I invite that party to address the
other side directly and explain that they have absolutely
reached their limit. I do this because it is important that they
gauge how serious the other party is. I then invite the party
who has made the final offer to leave while I discuss it with the
other party. This gives me the opportunity to keep the discus-
sions alive.
CASE STUDY 3:  AN EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CASE
In a recent case involving the denial of disability insurance
benefits to the plaintiff, the parties started the settlement con-
ference with over $1,000,000 difference between the plaintiff’s
demand and the defendant’s offer. Each side had a different
view of the interpretation of the insurance policy’s terms as
well as the strength of the plaintiff’s evidence. However, both
sides came to the table willing to settle, and after two hours of
negotiation they made significant progress and were only
$25,000 apart. At that point, however, both sides dug in their
heels and said they had reached their limit. I tried some of my
other techniques, but both sides refused to move and appeared
ready to throw in the towel. 
Since the plaintiff had made the last move and had moved
significantly, I could tell she would be much less likely to move
any further. I therefore proposed the “ultimatum” technique,
explaining that I would bring the defendant and counsel back
into the room and the plaintiff’s counsel should address them
directly to say that this was the take-it-or-leave-it number. The
idea that the plaintiff directly address the defendant at that








point was necessary to illustrate that this truly was the end of
the road—if the message came through me as the intermediary
it may not have carried the same impact. To allow the defen-
dant to consider the idea with a cooler head, I would not allow
him to respond right away, but rather gave him time to con-
sider it after the plaintiff left the room.
After the plaintiff agreed to this plan, I called the defendant
in and the plaintiff’s counsel proceeded to give the defendant
the ultimatum. I then explained to the defendant that they
need not respond immediately, and sent the plaintiff out of the
room. The defendant also left to discuss the issue privately
with counsel. He came back after several minutes and told me
that they would agree to meet the plaintiff’s demand. Although
the number was beyond the defendant’s desired range, he truly
wanted to settle the case and was not willing to sacrifice the
substantial progress made that day. I then brought the parties
back together and announced they had a deal. 
The advantage of this “last resort” technique is that it brings
a sense of finality to the discussions that forces the other party
to either settle or walk away.  A judge should proceed with cau-
tion—if used too early or when the parties are too far apart,
this technique could backfire and end the settlement confer-
ence prematurely. However, when the parties have come a long
way and are very close, it usually cannot hurt to make one last
attempt at bringing them to a compromise. If settlement is the
goal, this will force both sides to lay all their cards on the table
and determine whether they can really make it happen.   
CONCLUSION
The majority of cases filed in court settle, and judges are
becoming increasingly involved in this process. Parties often
need help overcoming obstacles to reach agreement. To be
most effective, a judge will be fully armed with impasse-break-
ing techniques to move the parties to resolution. While the
techniques described in this article will not be necessary or
useful in every conference, one or more of them can often help
turn a seemingly hopeless situation into a mutually beneficial
settlement. A judge should therefore consider these techniques
and whether they will be helpful to the situation at hand.
Judges who are able to do so will provide a great service to the
litigants who come before them. 
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the United States District Court for the
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009–2010 Term ushered in bothimportant federal law clarifications and divisive constitu-tional pronouncements. The Court performed much
work in the realm of civil procedure, doing away with Circuit
splits regarding the collateral-order doctrine and diversity
jurisdiction, and also explaining what it means to make a mis-
take for purposes of relation back—decisions sure to affect
many a federal practice. The Court also dabbled in employ-
ment law under Title VII; decided constitutional challenges to
several federal statutes, including an anti-terrorism statute;
and attempted to firm up the boundaries that inhere in the
constitutional concepts of federalism and separation of pow-
ers. But more than any of these other significant rulings, this
Term will likely be remembered for two of the Court’s deci-
sions that have easily earned “landmark” status:  McDonald v.
City of Chicago,1 in which the Court held the Second
Amendment applicable to the states, and Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission,2 in which the Court held that
groups of people organized as a corporation are entitled to the
same free-speech rights as individuals. This article attempts to
illuminate the rationale and possible implications of these and
other notable civil decisions from the Court’s 2009–2010 Term.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
In Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, the Court put to rest
a disagreement among Circuits over whether “disclosure
orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege qualify for
immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.”3 In
2007, Mohawk Industries found itself waging legal battles on
two fronts. Norman Carpenter, once a shift supervisor at a
Mohawk facility, sued Mohawk on the basis that he was wrong-
fully terminated. Carpenter claimed it was no coincidence that
he was fired after voicing concerns to human resources that
Mohawk was employing undocumented immigrants. Although
Carpenter had no idea, a whole class of plaintiffs shared
Carpenter’s concerns, as Mohawk was at that time defending a
class-action suit that claimed the company had conspired “to
drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hir-
ing undocumented workers.”4 Mohawk higher-ups ordered
Carpenter to meet with Mohawk’s defense counsel for the
class-action suit, where Carpenter was allegedly asked to back-
track on his statements. Carpenter’s refusal to comply, he
claims, led to his firing under false pretenses.
The class of plaintiffs caught wind of Carpenter’s exit and
moved for an evidentiary hearing to explore Carpenter’s com-
plaint. In response, Mohawk claimed that Carpenter fabricated
his story:  the meeting with Mohawk’s counsel was in fact part
of an investigation into Carpenter’s having violated company
policy by attempting to have Mohawk hire an undocumented
worker. Meanwhile, Carpenter’s own suit against Mohawk was
entering discovery and Carpenter moved to compel Mohawk’s
production of information regarding both Carpenter’s meeting
with corporate counsel and Mohawk’s termination decision.
Mohawk argued that the information was protected by the
attorney-client privilege. The district court agreed that the
information was privileged, yet granted Carpenter’s motion to
compel on the theory that Mohawk’s discovery responses in
the class-action suit waived the attorney-client privilege. The
court refused to certify its ruling for interlocutory appeal, but
gave Mohawk time to pursue appellate review through man-
damus or the collateral-order doctrine. Mohawk did just that,
and after finding no success in the Eleventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court granted review solely on the question of
whether the district court’s disclosure was immediately appeal-
able. 
Justice Sotomayor, writing for seven other justices, analyzed
the issue in traditional fashion by applying the Cohen require-
ments:  collateral rulings that do not end the litigation may
nevertheless be immediately appealable if (1) they are conclu-
sive, (2) they resolve important questions separate from the
merits, and (3) they are effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment. Focusing on the third factor, the Court
noted the importance of the attorney-client privilege, but
explained that the “crucial question, however, is not whether
an interest is important in the abstract; it is whether deferring
review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify
the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of 
relevant orders.”5 Applying this test, the Court held that the
interests served by the attorney-client privilege were ade-
quately protected by appellate courts’ ability to remedy the
improper disclosure of privileged material by vacating adverse
judgments and remanding for a new trial, excluding the pro-
tected material the second time around. As the Court
explained it, “deferring review until final judgment does not
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meaningfully reduce the ex ante incentives for full and frank
consultations between clients and counsel.”6
Further, to the extent the privilege guarantees the right not
to disclose information at all—as opposed to merely protecting
against its use at trial—the Court acknowledged the existence
of several litigation tools that help protect this right. A party
may seek immediate review through either an interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or a petition for a writ of
mandamus; or alternatively, parties may defy the district court’s
disclosure order and appeal any sanctions upon final judg-
ment. Also, the district court may issue protective orders to
hedge against the risk that leaked information might damage
the disclosing party outside of the courtroom. The fact that “a
fraction of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege may
nevertheless harm individual litigants in ways that are ‘only
imperfectly reparable’ does not justify making all such orders
immediately appealable as of right under § 1291.”7
In what may be the most interesting part of the opinion, the
Court once again acknowledged that the rulemaking process is
“the preferred means for determining whether and when pre-
judgment orders should be immediately appealable.”8 In fact,
this point motivated Justice Thomas’s concurrence, where he
expressed his readiness to do away with the Cohen analysis
altogether, characterizing the Court’s opinion as ironic because
of its potential to prejudice “the very matters it says would
benefit from ‘the collective experience of bench and bar’ and
the ‘opportunity for full airing’ that rulemaking provides.”9
In addition to Mohawk, the Court tackled another issue that
was causing confusion in the Circuits in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
refining the test for determining a corporation’s “principal
place of business” for purposes of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion.10 In 2007, two California citizens representing a proposed
class of California plaintiffs filed suit against Hertz
Corporation in California state court, claiming violations of
California’s wage and hour law. Hertz attempted to remove the
case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Hertz argued
it was diverse from the California plaintiffs because its princi-
pal place of business was in New Jersey, where its corporate
headquarters is located and where its “‘core executive and
administrative functions’” are carried out.11 The district court
disagreed with Hertz based on its application of the Ninth
Circuit’s principal-place-of-business test. The test instructs dis-
trict courts to first determine “the amount of a corporation’s
business activity State by State” and then look for one state that
has a significantly larger amount.12 Because the district court
found that Hertz’s activity in California significantly out-
weighed its activity elsewhere, the court did not reach the sec-
ond prong of the Ninth Circuit’s test, which locates a corpora-
tion’s principal place of business where “the majority of its
executive and administrative
functions are performed.”13 The
Ninth Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court’s analysis and the
Supreme Court granted review to
resolve the disparate Circuit
approaches.
In a unanimous decision, the
Court began by reviewing how
and why the principal-place-of-
business test came to be. The
Court related how many in
Congress had come to doubt whether the state-of-incorpora-
tion test for corporate citizenship was serving diversity juris-
diction’s policy of “opening the federal courts’ doors to those
who might otherwise suffer from local prejudice against out-
of-state parties.”14 Although simply applied, this test had two
undesirable consequences:  corporations manipulated federal
jurisdiction by incorporating in states where they did hardly
any business at all, and the resulting amount of diversity cases
caused the federal dockets to swell. Thus, in 1958, Congress
modified the diversity-jurisdiction statute so that a corporation
would be deemed a citizen “of the State where it has its prin-
cipal place of business,” in addition to the state of its incorpo-
ration.15
But, as the Court noted, lower courts encountered difficulty
in trying to locate a corporation’s principal place of business.
When a corporation’s activities were spread across numerous
states, most courts were focusing on “the nerve center”—the
place where officers direct, control, and coordinate business
activities. Contrastingly, when a corporation’s activities were
focused in a small number of states, many courts were exam-
ining where the actual business activities were taking place.
The Court noted the inherent difficulty in applying this latter
test:  “Perhaps because corporations come in many different
forms, involve many different kinds of business activities, and
locate offices and plants for different reasons in different ways
in different regions, a general ‘business activities’ approach has
proved unusually difficult to apply.”16 This difficulty quickly
snowballed into a variety of complex, multifactor tests, prone
to inconsistent application. The Court noted that this com-
plexity was likely the result of courts’ attempts to uphold the
rationale of diversity jurisdiction—to find the State where a
corporation is least likely to suffer local prejudice—but ulti-
mately, “that task seems doomed to failure.”17 This is because
local prejudice usually turns on factors that are difficult to
grasp, like corporate image, history, and advertising, as
opposed to the more measurable corporate business activities.
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diversity jurisdiction, the Court
chose the path of administrative
simplicity, holding that “principal
place of business” means “the
place where a corporation’s offi-
cers direct, control, and coordi-
nate the corporation’s activities,”
or, the corporation’s “nerve cen-
ter.”18 The Court noted three con-
siderations in support of its hold-
ing:  (1) the nerve-center test is
consistent with the diversity
statute’s language, which suggests the principal place of busi-
ness is a singular place within a state, not a state itself; (2) the
nerve-center test conserves both judicial and private resources
through administrative simplicity and greater predictability;
and (3) the nerve-center test aligns with the statute’s legislative
history, which suggests Congress intended “principal place of
business” to offer a simplistic test for lower courts. The Court
noted, however, that difficult cases will continue to arise given
today’s Internet-based business world, and that the nerve-cen-
ter test might sometimes produce a result that fails to align
with the policy of preventing local prejudice. As a parting shot,
the Court attempted to head off a few obvious opportunities
for jurisdictional manipulation, advising lower courts and par-
ties that merely designating a principal executive office on a
government form or holding an annual executive retreat in a
given location will not be sufficient evidence of principal place
of business.
In the last notable civil-procedure case, Krupski v. Costa
Crociere S.p.A., the Court cast aside the notion that a plaintiff’s
state of mind or lack of haste in amending pleadings could
affect relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.19
This case began in February 2007, when the plaintiff Wanda
Krupski tripped on board a cruise ship, fracturing her femur.
Krupski’s cruise ticket stated that “Costa Crociere S. p. A., an
Italian corporation,” was the cruise operator, and required that
any lawsuits be filed “within one year after the date of
injury.”20 The front of the ticket listed the Florida address of
“Costa Cruise Lines,” Costa Crociere’s sales and marketing
agent, and touted Costa Cruise—not Crociere—as a high-qual-
ity “cruise company.”21 Krupski’s counsel filed suit against
Costa Cruise in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Florida just three weeks before the one-year limita-
tions period expired, alleging that Costa Cruise was the cruise
operator. After the limitations period expired, Costa Cruise
repeatedly argued that Costa Crociere was the proper defen-
dant. Eventually, in July 2008, the district court allowed
Krupski to amend its complaint and add Costa Crociere as a
party, while at the same time dismissing Costa Cruise pursuant
to the parties’ joint stipulation. Costa Crociere responded by
moving to dismiss on the ground that Krupski’s amendment
did not relate back under Rule 15, and thus her claim was
untimely under the terms set out in her passenger ticket. 
The district court agreed. Although the first two elements of
Rule 15 were satisfied—the new claim arose out of the same
transaction and Costa Crociere received timely notice such
that it was not prejudiced—the court found difficulty in the
third element, which requires that the newly named party
“knew or should have known that the action would have been
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the property
party’s identity.”22 According to the district court, Krupski did
not make a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party:  Rule 15’s use of the word “mistake” did not encompass
what the court found was Krupski’s deliberate decision not to
sue Costa Crociere, a party whose identity Krupski was repeat-
edly made aware of, yet who Krupski decided to add only after
much delay. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling on two grounds. First, because the cruise ticket identi-
fied Costa Crociere as the cruise operator, Krupski “either
knew or should have known of Costa Crociere’s identity as a
potential party.” Second, because Krupski waited 133 days
after filing her initial complaint to seek leave to amend, and
then waited another month before actually amending, the dis-
trict court apparently did not abuse its discretion in “denying”
relation back.23
All nine Justices disagreed.24 Tackling the Eleventh Circuit’s
grounds one at a time, Justice Sotomayor first explained that
by “focusing on Krupski’s knowledge, the Court of Appeals
chose the wrong starting point.”25 The Court clarified that
whether a plaintiff knew or should have known the identity of
the proper party at the time of filing the original complaint
usually holds no relevance to relation back. Rather, the third
element under Rule 15 asks what the defendant knew or should
have known. The Court stated, however, that the plaintiff’s
knowledge might still be relevant to the extent it “bears on the
defendant’s understanding of whether the plaintiff made a mis-
take regarding the proper party’s identity.”26 But even for the
purposes of this narrow inquiry, the Court warned that a plain-
tiff’s mere knowledge of a party’s existence does not necessar-
ily equate to the absence of mistake:  “A plaintiff may know
that a prospective defendant—call him party A—exists, while
erroneously believing him to have the status of party B.”27 The
absence of mistake is instead signified by a deliberate choice to
sue a given party, coupled with a full understanding of “the fac-
tual and legal differences between the two parties.”28 But again,
such deliberate and informed decisions are only relevant inso-
far as they affect the defendant’s state of mind.
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Up to this point, the Court’s finely drawn line between the
knowledge of plaintiffs and prospective defendants remained
visible. But the Court’s distinction became slightly muddled
when it addressed Costa Crociere’s argument that an added
defendant could “reasonably believe that the plaintiff made no
mistake” if a “plaintiff is aware of the existence of two parties
and chooses to sue the wrong one.”29 The Court responded
that the “reasonableness of the mistake is not itself at issue.”30
But if Rule 15 is only concerned with whether the defendant
knew or should have known of the plaintiff’s mistake, it would
seem the reasonableness of the mistake is relevant—the more
unreasonable the mistake, the more deliberate the plaintiff’s
decision appears, and the less likely that a prospective defen-
dant should have known that such a mistake occurred. Indeed,
this logic would be consistent with the Court’s later explana-
tion of the policy behind its ruling, “A prospective defendant
who legitimately believed that the limitations period had
passed without any attempt to sue him has a strong interest in
repose.”31 Instead, the Court’s statement suggests that, so long
as a mistake actually occurred—no matter how unreason-
able—the third element of Rule 15 will be satisfied.
This potential glitch in the Court’s opinion might be
explained in part by the facts of this particular case. The unrea-
sonableness of Krupski’s mistake may very well have been out-
weighed, in the Court’s eyes, by the district court’s unchal-
lenged finding that Costa Crociere had constructive notice of
Krupski’s complaint—a complaint which plainly stated
Krupski’s intent to sue the company that “‘owned, operated,
managed, supervised and controlled’” the cruise ship.32 In
other words, it might have been so obvious Krupski was trying
to sue Costa Crociere that even the most unreasonable actions
could not justify the belief that Krupski had not mistakenly
sued Costa Cruise.
The Court next turned to the Eleventh Circuit’s second rea-
son for holding that relation back was not appropriate:
Krupski’s lack of diligence in amending her claim. The Court
handily did away with this logic, stating that Rule 15(c) does
not include diligence as a prerequisite for relation back, and
that courts do not have equitable discretion in making the rela-
tion-back determination.33 But once again the Court offered a
caveat to its holding, noting that a plaintiff’s conduct after ini-
tial filing might be relevant insofar as it affects the prospective
defendant’s belief about whether the plaintiff made a mistake
in initially filing suit. In this case, the Court felt that Krupski’s
133-day delay in seeking leave to amend was not “sufficient to
make reasonable any belief that she had made a deliberate and
informed decision not to sue Costa Crociere in the first
instance.”34
DUE PROCESS:  SELECTIVE
INCORPORATION
This Term, the Court issued
its inevitable follow up to the
two-year old District of Columbia
v. Heller,35 where the Court held
that the Second Amendment
guarantees citizens of the
District of Columbia the right to
keep handguns in their homes.
In the sequel, McDonald v. City of Chicago,36 several residents
and activist groups filed suits in federal district court challeng-
ing city ordinances that essentially prohibited the possession
of handguns in both Chicago and its suburb Oak Park. The
cases were consolidated and the district court, although
acknowledging Heller, held it was bound by prior precedent to
conclude that such handgun bans were constitutional. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed under a privileges-and-immunities
analysis, and so too declined the opportunity to predict
whether Heller and the Second Amendment would become
applicable to the states through selective incorporation. The
Supreme Court, of course, did not pass up this opportunity.
Justice Alito, writing for the same five Justices that carried
the day in Heller,37 began with a quick dispatching of the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis:  the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause may not impose Second
Amendment limits on state governments, but its Due Process
Clause may nevertheless achieve the same feat. The Court then
reviewed selective incorporation’s central tenet, that due
process protects those rights “of such a nature that they are
included in the conception of due process of law.”38 After devot-
ing much space to the Court’s previous, eloquent attempts at
expressing the limits of this concept, the Court ultimately con-
cluded that the key inquiry is “whether a particular Bill of
Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered lib-
erty and system of justice.”39 Stated another way, whether it is
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”40 Mere
inclusion in the Bill of Rights does not alone qualify a right for
incorporation through the Due Process Clause.41 But the Court
reemphasized that, if such rights are incorporated, they are “to
be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those
personal rights against federal encroachment.”42
Applying this framework to the question before it, the
Court ultimately held that the Second Amendment was incor-
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
In reaching this conclusion, unsurprisingly, the Court engaged
in a historical review much like the one it relied on in Heller.
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In Heller, the Court used history
to conclude that individual self-
defense is the “central compo-
nent” of the Second
Amendment;43 here, the Court
used history to show why this
right of individual self-defense is
fundamental. Going as far back
as the 17th century, the Court
found it notable that the English
Bill of Rights recognized a right
to keep arms for self-defense, and as early as 1765, Blackstone
declared this right to be fundamental. The Court explained
how 18th-century American colonists shared this point of
view, as evidenced by opposition to the King’s attempted disar-
mament of the colonies. The fundamental nature of this right
was also evident in the debates of those who framed the Bill of
Rights:  Antifederalists feared that the federal government
would disarm the people and Federalists claimed that the gov-
ernment’s constitutionally limited powers made infringement
of this important right impossible. As the Court concluded,
“Antifederalists and Federalists alike agreed that the right to
bear arms was fundamental to the newly formed system of gov-
ernment.”44 The compromise between these two groups
resulted in the Second Amendment.
In what is perhaps the most persuasive piece of historical
evidence, the Court showed how concern over the right to bear
arms was itself an impetus for ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Fast-forwarding to the mid-19th century, the
Court explained how cooling Antifederalist fears were replaced
by an emphasis on the right of self-defense. As the Civil War
ended, droves of African-American veterans of the Union
Army returned to the South only to be stripped of their
firearms—both by force of law and by physical violence. The
39th Congress took note of such injustices and responded with
the Freedmen’s Bureau bill and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
both of which explicitly recognized the right of all citizens to
keep and bear arms, regardless of skin color. These legislative
responses, the Court concluded, “demonstrate that the right
was still recognized to be fundamental.”45 Ultimately, Congress
felt a constitutional amendment was necessary to successfully
protect this fundamental right, among others. Thus, the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed, which was generally
“understood to provide a constitutional basis for protecting the
rights set out in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”46 As further evi-
dence of this right’s fundamental nature, the Court offered sev-
eral excerpts from congressional debates over the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court also pointed out that, at the time of
the Amendment’s ratification, 22 of 37 state constitutions had
already recognized the right to bear arms.
Lastly, the Court declined the municipalities’ invitation to
deviate from the selective incorporation analysis it has pre-
ferred over the last 50 years. The Court made clear that a right’s
incorporation does not turn on the ability “to imagine any civ-
ilized legal system that does not recognize a particular right,”47
but whether the right is fundamental from an American per-
spective.
The Court did not make clear, however, the standard of
review that should apply to laws that burden the right to bear
arms. Nor do the small clues that did make their way into the
opinion offer any further enlightenment. At one point, the
Court agreed with and quoted from an amicus brief filed by 38
states, which noted that state and local “‘experimentation with
reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second
Amendment.’”48 The notion that “reasonable” firearm regula-
tions will be permissible does not necessarily reek of the strict
scrutiny that the Court often employs in the realm of funda-
mental rights. On the other hand, one might not read too
much into this quote, as the Court also reaffirmed what it said
in Heller, that Second Amendment rights should not be deter-
mined by “judicial interest balancing.”49
Given the importance of the issue, it is not surprising that
this case produced voluminous concurring and dissenting
opinions. Justice Scalia concurred in the Court’s result, briefly
expressing his usual doubts about the origins of substantive
due process, using most of his space to pick at the analytical
framework forwarded by Justice Stevens’s dissent. Justice
Scalia took issue with what he felt was a very subjective
approach, which favors a multifactor test over the plurality’s
historical, tradition-based approach. Justice Scalia summed up
his qualm with this approach when he observed that the “abil-
ity of omnidirectional guideposts to constrain is inversely pro-
portional to their number . . . even individually, each
lodestar or limitation [Justice Stevens] lists either is incapable
of restraining judicial whimsy or cannot be squared with the
precedents he seeks to preserve.”50 But as Justice Stevens
pointed out in his dissent, Justice Scalia’s historical, tradition-
based approach is also vulnerable to subjectivity. Justice
Thomas wrote a concurrence as well, in which he engaged in
his own historical account to show why it is the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, not the Due Process Clause, which guar-
antees state citizens the right to bear arms.
Turning next to the dissents, Justice Stevens disagreed with
the plurality notion that, if incorporated against the states,
constitutional rights reflect identically the scope of federal
rights. In other words, he prefers the “two-track” approach.
For Justice Stevens, substantive due process, not selective
incorporation, presents the proper inquiry in this case—selec-
tive incorporation is merely one “subset” of substantive due
process.51 Thus, under his analysis, Heller’s interpretation of
the Second Amendment has no bearing on the question of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
guarantees state citizens the right to possess handguns in their
homes. As mentioned above, Justice Stevens proposed several
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factors that must be examined to answer this question, includ-
ing “[t]extual commitments laid down elsewhere in the
Constitution, judicial precedents, English common law, leg-
islative and social facts, scientific and professional develop-
ments, practices of other civilized societies, and, above all else,
the traditions and conscience of our people.”52 Justice Stevens
emphasized, however, that there is no “all-purpose, top-down,
totalizing theory of ‘liberty.’”53 In applying this approach, it
seems his principal deviation from the plurality lay in the
import he took from the plurality’s historical evidence:  “The
many episodes of brutal violence against African-Americans
that blight our Nation’s history . . . do not suggest that every
American must be allowed to own whatever type of firearm he
or she desires—just that no group of Americans should be sys-
tematically and discriminatorily disarmed and left to the mercy
of racial terrorists.”54
Lastly, Justice Breyer dissented, raising new historical evi-
dence regarding the enactment of the Second Amendment in
an attempt to cast doubt on Heller. He goes on to offer several
reasons why, even taking Heller to be correct, incorporation of
the Second Amendment is not appropriate. Much like Justice
Stevens’s approach, Justice Breyer believes that other factors,
outside of history, merit consideration for such an important
inquiry.
FIRST AMENDMENT:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Although McDonald’s incorporation of the Second
Amendment was certainly one of the landmark decisions of
this Term, it may still take a backseat to the commotion over
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.55 In this case,
the Court overruled two relatively recent campaign finance
First Amendment precedents—McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission and Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce56—
and set off a wave of criticism among journalists and legal
commentators alike.57
Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, brought this case
to the Supreme Court after a federal district court ruled that
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohib-
ited the distribution and advertising of its documentary,
Hillary: The Movie. The documentary was quite critical of then-
Senator and democratic presidential nominee hopeful Hillary
Clinton. Citizens United planned to pay a cable company to
make the documentary available through video-on-demand in
the time period leading up to the 2008 primary elections.
According to the district court, this expenditure fell under the
BCRA’s provision prohibiting corporations from spending gen-
eral treasury funds on “electioneering communications”—
defined as “‘any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication’
that ‘refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office’
and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a gen-
eral election.”58 Although
Citizens United initially argued
that this prohibition was merely
unconstitutional as applied to
its documentary, the Court felt
it was obligated to reconsider
Austin and McConnell. Thus, the
Court had to decide whether
the holdings of those cases were
correct—whether “political
speech may be banned based on
the speaker’s corporate iden-
tity.”59
The gist of Justice Kennedy’s
answer to this question was simple enough:  the First
Amendment prevents the Government from silencing a group
of speakers merely because they have taken on the corporate
form. The Court derived this conclusion from two key cases,
Buckley v. Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.60
According to the Court, Buckley held that limits on individual,
independent campaign spending violated the First
Amendment; Bellotti held that the First Amendment prohibits
the Government from imposing speech restrictions based on a
speaker’s corporate identity. Considering these two holdings
together, the Court determined that the BCRA’s prohibition on
independent corporate expenditures was unconstitutional:  if
Buckley guarantees individuals the constitutional right to make
independent expenditures without limit, then Bellotti guaran-
tees corporations that same right. But the Court’s opinion is
more than just reliance on prior precedent; it is clear that the
Court viewed this law as repugnant to the First Amendment
principles so important to a functioning democracy:  “By sup-
pressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit
and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and view-
points from reaching the public and advising voters on which
persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”61
Despite this tension with First Amendment principles, the
constitutionality of the BCRA’s prohibition might have been
saved if it were the least restrictive means of achieving a com-
pelling governmental interest. Austin, decided after the two
aforementioned cases, forwarded such a justification, holding
that the Government had a compelling interest in preventing
the “‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the cor-
porate form and that have little or no correlation to the pub-
lic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’”62 But accord-
ing to the Court, this anti-distortion rationale was used as a
means to avoid the ultimate implications of Buckley and
Bellotti. Thus, the Court overruled Austin as an “aberration,”63
holding that the government has no interest in equalizing the
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political playing field and that it
cannot limit political speech
based on the amount of a corpo-
ration’s wealth. The Court fur-
ther noted that it does not mat-
ter that the funds used for cor-
porate speech are accumulated
from a public that might dissent
from the corporate message,
because even individual speakers “use money amassed from
the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The First
Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was
enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who
disagree with the speaker’s ideas.”64
For the Court, the danger of the opposite conclusion was
gravely illuminated by two hypothetical situations. If the anti-
distortion rationale were correct, media outlets, which are
often organized as corporations, theoretically would not be
able to express their political views during the specified elec-
tion times.65 Second, although “electioneering communica-
tions” does not encompass the print medium under the BCRA,
the anti-distortion rationale would theoretically allow the
Government to prevent corporations from printing books.
Putting these hypothetical concerns aside, the practical reality
of this case is that for-profit corporations may now spend
unlimited amounts of money to advocate for candidates in the
key months leading up to elections. As mentioned above, this
pragmatic consequence led to much ire from commentators,
and no doubt it motivated Justice Stevens’s spirited dissent,
joined by three other Justices.
Justice Stevens began by criticizing what he felt was the
majority’s lack of judicial restraint in looking beyond Citizens
United’s as-applied challenge to reconsider Austin and
McConnell. For him, the case was more appropriately resolved
by holding that the BCRA’s statutory prohibition on election-
eering communications simply did not encompass Hillary. He
took further issue with the Court’s repeated characterization of
the BCRA’s limit on electioneering communications as a total
“ban,” pointing out that members of a corporation are free to
create and fund political action committees to continue
“speaking” in favor of political candidates as a group. Also, to
the extent the majority doubted the ease with which corpora-
tions could implement and manage PACs, he noted that the
Court’s judicial activism left “no record to show how substan-
tial the burden really is, just the majority’s own unsupported
factfinding.”66
In addition to questioning the posture on which the case
was decided, Justice Stevens disagreed with the very essence of
the majority’s First Amendment analysis. The majority held
that the First Amendment guarantees corporations the same
speech rights as individuals, and that the democratic process
will benefit from their unfettered voices. Quite oppositely,







Justice Stevens argued that the First Amendment allows—and
that the principles of democracy require—this distinction
between human and corporation:
In the context of election to public office, the dis-
tinction between corporate and human speakers is sig-
nificant. Although they make enormous contributions
to our society, corporations are not actually members
of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they
may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their
interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the
interests of eligible voters. The financial resources,
legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corpo-
rations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the
electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling
constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to
take measures designed to guard against the potentially
deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and
national races.67
Justice Stevens also expressed serious doubts about the
interpretation of precedent the majority used to arrive at its
decision. Most significantly, he explained that Bellotti did not
in fact hold that individuals and corporations must enjoy iden-
tical parameters of free speech, especially with regard to inde-
pendent expenditures. To the contrary, Bellotti involved a view-
point-discriminatory state statute aimed at restricting busi-
ness-corporation expenditures on a specific tax referendum,
which “plainly offended” the First Amendment.68 Not only
that, but Justice Stevens pointed out that Bellotti expressly
stated that its holding did not apply to the “‘context of partici-
pation in a political campaign for election to public office.’”69
Lastly, Justice Stevens attacked the majority’s interpretation
and under-appreciation of the compelling governmental inter-
ests forwarded by Austin. According to him, Austin’s holding
was not merely based on the interest in preventing some
potential distortion among human and corporate speakers.
Rather, that holding was justified by the broader concern over
the potential corruption of the political process that such large
independent expenditures might cause, of which the distortion
of individual voters’ voices was merely a part. Justices Stevens
pointed to the massive legislative record accompanying the
BCRA’s passage as evidence that these broad concerns have
come to fruition, with large corporate expenditures creating
the appearance of political tradeoffs. As he put it, “In an age in
which money and television ads are the coin of the campaign
realm, it is hardly surprising that corporations deployed these
ads to curry favor with, and to gain influence over, public offi-
cials.”70 The majority does not disagree that even the appear-
ance of quid pro quo corruption presents a valid justification for
the regulation of speech; at this point, the majority simply does
not see corporate independent expenditures as creating this
appearance.
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Ultimately, Citizens United displayed the stark contrast
between the views of the Court’s liberal and conservative wings
regarding both the political realities created by independent
corporate expenditures and the implications of the First
Amendment itself. Unlike Citizens United, the Court’s other
First Amendment decisions this Term were not so hotly con-
tested, but are perhaps equally fascinating. 
In United States v. Stevens, the Court considered the consti-
tutionality of a federal statute that attempted to criminalize
“the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depic-
tions of animal cruelty.”71 Robert Stevens, indicted for hawking
various types of dog-fighting videos, challenged the statute as
facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s guaran-
tee of free speech. More than anything, the Court’s response
exposed an instance of poor legislative drafting, but it also con-
tained a bit of interesting First Amendment analysis. 
Applying the overbreadth doctrine, an eight-Justice major-
ity held that the law was capable of too many unconstitutional
applications.72 The statute defined “depictions of animal cru-
elty” as “any visual or auditory depiction . . . of conduct in
which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tor-
tured, wounded, or killed” in a manner that is illegal under
state or federal law.73 The words “wounded” and “killed,” the
Court noted, did not carry any “cruel” qualifier and they do
not inherently imply cruelty. Moreover, the statute’s require-
ment that the depicted conduct be illegal under federal or state
law did not serve to narrow the statute’s focus to depictions of
animal cruelty. As the Court pointed out, there are numerous
state and federal laws concerning the proper treatment of ani-
mals that have no relation to animal cruelty. For instance, there
exist countless nuances among the lawful methods of hunting
in various states, with some states outlawing hunting alto-
gether. Thus, the statute criminalizes videos or magazines
depicting a particular type of hunting—which might be legal
in some states—if possessed or sold in a state where such hunt-
ing is not legal. Given the enormity of the hunting industry, the
Court concluded that the statute’s criminal prohibition was so
broad as to be unconstitutional.
From a First Amendment standpoint, the Court’s over-
breadth analysis is interesting in that it allowed the Court to
avoid deciding whether a prohibition that strictly applied to
depictions of animal cruelty would be constitutional.74 But
despite the avoidance of this important question, the Court did
venture to say that animal cruelty would not join the slim
ranks of speech categories that receive no protection whatso-
ever under the First Amendment, such as obscenity or inciting
speech.75 The Court acknowledged, however, that there might
be other types of speech not yet recognized by the Court that
belong in this group. The
Justices did not provide any con-
crete test for singling out these
types of speech, other than
pointing out that other cate-
gories had been “previously rec-
ognized” by the legal commu-
nity and were “long-estab-
lished.”76 In any case, animal
cruelty does not belong in this
group, and therefore any speech
restriction based on animal cruelty would be deemed content-
based and subject to strict scrutiny. It seems likely, however,
that a more narrowly drawn statute might pass strict scrutiny
on the compelling governmental interest in reinforcing restric-
tions on the underlying conduct depicted—i.e., animal cru-
elty.77
Also this Term, the Court clarified the distinction between
a First Amendment-overbreadth challenge and a Fifth
Amendment Due Process-vagueness challenge. In Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, the Court considered a challenge to
the federal statute that prohibits individuals or groups from
providing “material support” to foreign terrorist organiza-
tions.78 The plaintiffs, various human-rights and nonprofit
organizations, requested declaratory relief so that they might
go ahead with efforts to support the humanitarian and politi-
cal arms of two foreign terrorist organizations. The plaintiffs
sought to provide legal training—teaching the groups how to
use international law and the United Nations to peaceably
resolve disputes—and to engage in political advocacy on
behalf of these groups. 
For their first argument, the plaintiffs contended that the
statute’s definition of “material support”—including the terms
“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “per-
sonnel”—was unconstitutionally vague.79 For example, the
plaintiffs argued it was unclear whether the statute prohibited
them from providing a course on geography to members of
these foreign groups. The problem with the plaintiffs’ chal-
lenge, the Court explained, was that it relied on hypothetical
modes of support to illustrate the statute’s grayer areas, while
a person of common intelligence would clearly understand
that legal training was prohibited under the statute’s defini-
tions of “training” and “expert advice or assistance.” Thus,
even when a statute’s prohibition covers speech, and “a height-
ened vagueness standard applies, a plaintiff whose speech is
clearly proscribed cannot raise a successful vagueness claim
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for lack
of notice.”80 The Court explained that such hypothetical sce-
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narios were only relevant to a
First Amendment-overbreadth
argument.
Turning next to the plain-
tiffs’ as-applied First
Amendment challenge, the
Court first noted that the
statute does not prohibit any
independent advocacy or
expression; rather, it is “care-
fully drawn to cover only a nar-
row category of speech to,
under the direction of, or in
coordination with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be
terrorist organizations.”81 Thus, to the extent the plaintiffs
wanted to provide political advocacy that was not coordinated
with the foreign terrorist groups, they were free to do so. But
the statute did prohibit the plaintiffs from providing material
support in the form of speech to these groups. In that sense,
the statute was content-based and the Government had the
burden of showing that it was necessary to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest. 
Neither the parties nor the Court had any doubt that com-
bating terrorism is “an urgent objective of the highest order;”82
the only question was whether the statute’s prohibition on
material support—including, as in this case, support for a ter-
rorist organization’s legitimate activities—was necessary to
combat terrorism. Six Justices held that prohibiting even this
good-intentioned support was indeed necessary. Deferring to
both congressional and executive branch findings, the Court
concluded that “[s]uch support frees up other resources within
the organization that may be put to violent ends,” because for-
eign terrorist organizations do not maintain legitimate “fire-
walls” between their “civil, nonviolent activities” and their
“violent, terrorist operations.”83 The majority was careful to
note, however, that “‘authority and expertise in these matters
do not automatically trump the Court’s own obligation to
secure the protection that the Constitution grants to individu-
als.’”84
In addition to passing judgment on all of these federal
statutes, the Court also entertained a pair of First Amendment
cases regarding state action. In John Doe #1 v. Reed, a group of
citizens challenged Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA) as
an unconstitutional burden on Free Speech.85 This case began
with the Washington government’s passage of a controversial
bill that provided expanded benefits to registered same-sex
domestic partners. The plaintiffs signed a petition to initiate a
process where Washington citizens can subject any given state
law to referendum approval. After the bill was put to a vote and
upheld, various groups that favored the bill sought to obtain a
copy of the petition, which was considered a public record and
thus available for public inspection and copying under
Washington’s PRA.
Given that these groups intended to post the petition on a
public website in a searchable format, the plaintiff signatories
challenged the PRA as unconstitutionally burdening their
political expression. Before deciding the issue, the Court noted
the unique scope of the question before it, stating that the
plaintiffs’ claim resembled both an as-applied challenge and a
facial challenge:  
The claim is “as applied” in the sense that it does
not seek to strike the PRA in all its applications, but
only to the extent it covers referendum petitions. The
claim is “facial” in that it is not limited to plaintiffs’
particular case, but challenges application of the law
more broadly to all referendum petitions.86
In an interesting juxtaposition to Citizens United—where
the Court looked beyond the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge
and considered the BCRA’s facial validity—the Court refused
the plaintiffs’ request to construe their claim as challenging the
validity of Washington’s PRA in light of its specific application
to them. 
The plaintiffs could not satisfy the burden that accompa-
nied this broader “facial” challenge, failing to show that the
PRA would be unconstitutional in every application to refer-
endum petitions. The Court acknowledged the political nature
of signing a referendum petition, but nevertheless applied an
intermediate form of scrutiny given the PRA was merely a dis-
closure requirement and not a prohibition on political speech.
Ultimately, the Court held that the disclosure requirement was
substantially related to the important governmental interest of
promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral
process. This substantial relationship lies in the fact that pub-
lic disclosure allows the public to supplement the state’s own
efforts to verify the petition’s signatures as legitimate. Further,
from a general standpoint, this governmental interest is pro-
portional to the incidental burden on speech that might result
from the fear of harassment a public disclosure of an individ-
ual’s signature could illicit. This was true for the Court given
that most bills put to a referendum vote through the petition
process do not involve such controversial issues, and thus the
usual burdens are not “remotely like the burdens plaintiffs fear
in this case.”87 Whether these specific burdens might have
constitutional significance is a question the Court left to the
district courts—for now.
The second case involving state action was Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez.88 In this case, the Christian Legal Society
(CLS), a student group at the University of California’s
Hastings College of the Law, brought a § 1983 action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief from Hastings’s “admit all-
comers” student-organization policy. Hastings’s policy allows
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registered student organizations to receive certain benefits—
including possible financial assistance from the law school and
access to school facilities—in exchange for complying with
certain policies. The plaintiff student group took issue with
Hastings’s nondiscrimination policy, which the school inter-
preted to require all student groups to “allow any student to
participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in
the organization,” regardless of status or beliefs.89 CLS inter-
preted its bylaws to exclude individuals who carry religious
convictions that deviate from the group’s beliefs and to exclude
individuals who engage in “unrepentant homosexual con-
duct.”90 Given these exclusive bylaws, Hastings denied CLS
registered-organization status, but offered it most of the atten-
dant benefits anyway, save for financial support from the
school. This denial led CLS to challenge Hastings’s policy as an
unconstitutional burden on its First Amendment free-speech
and expressive-association rights.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a 5-to-4 majority, explained
that CLS’s challenge was properly analyzed under the Court’s
limited-public-forum jurisprudence, and not the more
demanding standard that is sometimes used to analyze associ-
ational-freedom cases. The Court reasoned that it would be
inconsistent to forgo the lesser scrutiny applicable to limited
public forums merely because a case involves expressive asso-
ciation as opposed to speech. This is especially true in cases
where, as here, expressive association and speech are closely
linked, and the challenged rule applies “only indirect pressure”
upon groups’ membership policies, as opposed to direct com-
pulsion.91 Thus, given that the limited-public-forum standard
controlled, Hastings had the burden of showing that its restric-
tion on access was reasonable given the purpose of the forum,
and that it was not discriminating against speech on the basis
of viewpoint. 
The Court first summarized the various justifications
offered by Hastings to support its all-comers policy, finding all
of them to be reasonable:  to ensure that “leadership, educa-
tional, and social opportunities” provided by registered stu-
dent organizations are available to all students; to allow
Hastings to police its nondiscrimination policy without inquir-
ing into student organizations’ reasons for restricting member-
ship; to encourage “tolerance, cooperation, and learning
among students;” and finally, to advance state-law goals by
choosing not to subsidize “conduct of which the people of
California disapprove.”92 The Court found the all-comers pol-
icy to be all the more reasonable given the substantial alterna-
tive channels of communication made available to CLS in spite
of their non-registered status, including access to school facil-
ities for meetings and the use of bulletin boards and chalk-
boards for advertising. These alternative channels of commu-
nication, however, cannot save what is otherwise a viewpoint-
discriminatory restriction on limited-public-forum access. But
the Court had very little trouble in concluding that Hastings’s
policy was viewpoint neutral:
“It is, after all, hard to imagine
a more viewpoint-neutral pol-
icy than one requiring all stu-
dent groups to accept all com-
ers.”93 Ultimately, given its rea-
sonableness and viewpoint
neutrality, the Court held
Hastings’s all-comers policy did
not violate the First
Amendment.
Justice Alito dissented from the Court’s opinion and was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and
Thomas. Though the dissenters did disagree with the major-
ity’s dispatching of certain precedents they felt were control-
ling, their main qualm seemed to lie in the Court’s interpreta-
tion of the factual record before it. While the majority was con-
tent to analyze the constitutionality of the purported all-com-
ers policy, the dissent argued that the record exposed this pol-
icy as mere pretext, developed after litigation was initiated. For
the dissent, the proper issue was whether Hastings’s written
nondiscrimination policy constituted an impermissible burden
on speech or associational expression. If the dissent’s interpre-
tation of the facts is correct, its conclusion that Hastings’s pol-
icy is unconstitutional as viewpoint discriminative is difficult
to deny—the written policy prohibited student groups from
excluding members on the basis of religion, but not on the
basis of other, secular characteristics like political affiliation.94
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
In addition to grappling with these difficult constitutional
questions, the Court resolved a novel issue regarding the time-
liness of Title VII employment discrimination suits. Though
not as philosophically stimulating as some of the Court’s other
writings this Term, it seems likely that Lewis v. City of Chicago
will not go unnoticed in employment law circles.95 This case
dates back to 1995, when the city of Chicago sought to pare
down the list of some 26,000 applicants seeking employment
with the City’s fire department by administering a written
examination. The City released the results in January 1996 and
announced that applicants who scored an 89 percent or better
would be selected at random to move forward in the applica-
tion process. This random selection process was repeated 11
times over the next six years until all of the top scorers were
selected. In March of 1997, an African-American applicant
who did not score in the top tier, and thus did not get hired,
filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission (EEOC). The EEOC granted the
right to sue, and the man filed a Title VII suit alleging that the
City’s policy of selecting only from the 89-percent-or-better
pool had a disparate impact on African Americans. The district
court eventually certified a class of 6,000 plaintiffs consisting
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of African Americans who
passed the examination but
did not score in the City’s
preferred range.
The City conceded that
the 89-percent cutoff had a
disparate impact, but it
defended on the ground that
the only actionable instance
of discrimination occurred in
January 1996, when it first
divided the applicants into
different tiers. The City argued, therefore, that even if the
March 1997 filing date of the initial plaintiff’s EEOC charge
applied to the entire class,96 the plaintiffs’ claim was untimely
under Title VII, which requires a discrimination charge to be
filed with the EEOC within 300 days of accrual.97 Thus, the
issue for the Court was “whether a plaintiff who does not file
a timely charge challenging the adoption of a practice . . . may
assert a disparate-impact claim in a timely charge challenging
the employer’s later application of that practice.”98 The Court
easily, and unanimously, held that the plaintiffs had presented
a timely claim because, although “the City had adopted the eli-
gibility list . . . earlier . . . it made use of the practice of exclud-
ing those who scored 88 or below each time it filled a new class
of firefighters.”99
The practical effect of the Court’s holding is that employees
may sue under Title VII based on recently realized disparate
impacts that result from employment policies long ago
adopted. The Court acknowledged the City and its amici’s
point that this may create notable practical problems in resolv-
ing disputes, including evidence-gathering problems. But the
Court simply responded that if such consequences were unin-
tended, “it is a problem for Congress, not one that federal
courts can fix.”100
FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS
While the Court was most often demarcating the fine lines
that lie between the people and government, this Term also
forced the Court to retrace—or redraw, depending on point of
view—the line between state and federal power. In United
States v. Comstock, five incarcerated individuals challenged the
constitutionality of a federal statute that allowed the
Department of Justice to keep the individuals civilly commit-
ted beyond the length of their sentences.101 The statute allows
a district court to order civil commitment of a federal inmate
if the Government can prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the individual “has engaged in sexually violent
activity or child molestation in the past and . . . he suffers
from a mental illness that makes him correspondingly dan-
gerous to others.”102 Although the plaintiffs lodged numerous
constitutional arguments in the district court, the only issue
on review was whether Congress, in creating this civil com-
mitment statute, exceeded its constitutionally enumerated
powers. Specifically, the Government petitioned the Court to
decide whether Congress’s enactment was justified under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives Congress the
power to make laws that “carry[] into Execution” its other
enumerated powers.103
Seven members of the Court agreed that the Necessary and
Proper Clause justified the statute, though only four joined
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion.104 The majority laid out five
considerations in support of its holding. First, the Clause
grants Congress broad authority to legislate, which in turn
suggests a tame standard of review where the Court merely
looks “to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power.”105 The Court explained that as long as this
rational relation exists, Congress, and not the courts, may
determine how closely the means will relate to the end. It is
this loose means-ends relationship that upholds the existence
of the vast majority of federal criminal statutes.
The second and third considerations more or less apply this
test. The Court summarized the history of Congress’s mental-
health-civil-commitment schemes, characterizing the statute at
issue as a marginal “addition.” In other words, this statute is
very similar to statutes that have long been recognized as ratio-
nally related to some enumerated power. Next, in perhaps the
most provocative of the five considerations, the Court tra-
versed the multi-leg route that connects this civil commitment
statute to a constitutionally enumerated power:  this statute is
“reasonably adapted” to further Congress’s “power to act as a
responsible federal custodian,” and this federal custodian
power is itself justified because it furthers “federal criminal
statutes that legitimately seek to implement constitutionally
enumerated authority.”106
Moving to the fourth consideration, the Court emphasized
the statute’s deference to the States—the statute requires the
Attorney General to inform the State where the federal pris-
oner is domiciled or was tried of the possibility of civil com-
mitment, and encourage the State to assume custody. Given
that the Court long ago rejected a State-sovereignty-based
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challenge to a less deferential civil-commitment statute,107 it
concluded there was no federalism problem here. The final
consideration driving the Court’s conclusion was the narrow
scope of the statute—applying only to individuals in federal
custody—which cuts against the concern that the Court’s
holding steps closer to creating some kind of federal police
power.
Reading the Court’s opinion, this case’s impact on federal-
ism may seem tenuous—as the majority showed, the federal
statute did not overtly tread on some area of State sovereignty.
Motivating the two dissenters, it seems, is the fear that such a
broad reading of Congress’s power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause will nevertheless chip away at the vast remnant
of power meant for the States. Justice Thomas, joined by
Justice Scalia, first pointed out what he felt was a critical mis-
step in the Court’s analysis:  the Court’s failure to first make
sure that the statute’s end was “legitimate,” in other words,
aimed at furthering an express constitutional power.108 If the
end is illegitimate, the means-end relationship is irrelevant. In
this case, Justice Thomas could see no legitimate end, because
“it is clear, on the face of the Act and in the Government’s argu-
ments urging its constitutionality, that [the statute] is aimed at
protecting society from acts of sexual violence, not toward ‘car-
rying into Execution’ any enumerated power or powers of the
Federal Government.”109 Nor did Justice Thomas agree that
the statute’s constitutionality could be saved by merely looking
to other, valid criminal statutes and concluding that the statute
at issue is related to those laws, and thus is related to an enu-
merated power. This rationale, Justice Thomas wrote, “if fol-
lowed to its logical extreme, would result in unwarranted
expansion of federal power.”110
Lastly, the Court was also busy in its role as referee between
the executive and legislative branches. In Free Enterprise Fund
v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, an accounting
firm and the nonprofit Free Enterprise Fund asked the Court
to declare the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
unconstitutional and to enjoin the Board from exercising its
powers.111 The Board, a private nonprofit corporation created
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to regulate the accounting industry
more closely, features five members who are appointed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The plaintiffs argued
unconstitutionality on the ground that the Board members, as
executive officers,112 were too far insulated from executive
review:  the Commission may only remove the Board members
for cause, and the President in turn may only remove the
Commission members for cause, thus diluting the executive’s
control over the Board members. The question for the Court,
then, was whether this double layer of protection was incon-
sistent with the separation of
powers envisioned by the
Constitution.
In a 5-to-4 decision, the
Court held that the
Constitution could not tolerate
the “dual for-cause limita-
tions.”113 Chief Justice Roberts
began by recalling the long-
held understanding that because it is the President’s constitu-
tional responsibility to ensure the laws are executed, he must
have the resultant “‘power of removing those for whom he can
not continue to be responsible.’”114 This power is tempered, of
course, by Congress’s ability to impose for-cause limits on the
President’s removal power when some level of independence is
desirable, i.e., when officers are performing quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial functions. The Court noted that a similar logic
has been applied to uphold for-cause limitations on depart-
ment heads’ ability to remove inferior executive officers. 
But the Court explained that when both types of limitations
come together in one chain of authority, it creates a situation
where Board members are not removable except for good
cause, and the President has no say on whether that good cause
exists. “The result is a Board that is not accountable to the
President, and a President who is not responsible for the
Board.”115 This is markedly different from the situation where
the Board members are not insulated from the Commission by
a for-cause standard, and the “President could then hold the
Commission to account for its supervision of the Board, to the
same extent that he may hold the Commission to account for
everything else it does.”116 Instead, the double for-cause stan-
dard “impaired” the President’s “ability to execute the laws []
by holding his subordinates accountable for their conduct.”117
For the Court, the necessity of this holding was only height-
ened by the fear that approving two layers would lead
Congress to impose even more layers of protection in the
future. Ultimately, the Court merely severed the part of
Sarbanes-Oxley that imposed for-cause limits on the
Commission’s ability to remove Board members, as opposed to
dispatching the Board altogether.
The dissent, led by Justice Breyer, felt the Court’s opinion
was too far removed from the practical realities of executive
governance—any for-cause limitation will have a far lesser
affect than the slew of political and administrative factors that
limit the President’s power to “get something done.”118 The
dissent also attempted to poke a large hole in the principal
logic of the majority’s holding:  if the President really is pre-
vented from removing the Commissioners but for good cause








(the first layer of insulation), then, regardless of any second
layer, the President will have no power to effect the removal of
Board members if the Commission reasonably decides not to
do so on its own. In the dissent’s words, “the majority’s deci-
sion to eliminate only Layer Two accomplishes virtually noth-
ing.”119 Lastly, the dissent raised serious concerns over
whether the Court’s opinion might result in the future invali-
dation of entire administrative agencies given that severability
might not always be available as a constitutional cure.
The colossal importance of so many of the Court’s decisions
this Term is undeniable. The opinions are fascinating in and of
themselves, but, like all of the Court’s decisions, awaiting the
repercussions (good or bad) will be the most interesting part.
With decisions touching corporate freedom of speech, the
right to possess handguns in the home, terrorism, animal cru-
elty, and executive power, the coming years should be interest-
ing indeed.
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WEB RESOURCES
National Center for State Courts,
Continuity of Court Operations:
Steps for COOP Planning 
(2007, updated 2010)
www.ncsconline.org/coop
Since its publication in 2007, the
National Center for State Courts’ manual
on continuity of court operations has
been used by many jurisdictions to create
a continuity of operations plan. Project
staff recently reviewed and updated, as
necessary, all hyperlinks in the 2007
online version of this useful publication.
In addition, newer publications of rele-
vance, such as the Federal Continuity
Directive 1 (Dept. of Homeland Security,
2008) are now refered to and linked in
the document.
The online version of this manual is
particularly convenient because of the
hyperlinks to key resources on every
topic. The manual is carefully structured
to help courts plan for continuity in the
face of various possible emergency events,
including ones that come without warn-
ing. The manual takes you step by step
through the planning process, the ele-
ments of a useful continuity plan, how to
complete a plan, and how to maintain and
practice a continuity plan once it has been
prepared. Worksheets guide you through
topics like how to determine what are
essential functions, how to set up alter-
nate work sites, how to handle communi-
cations, and how to inventory vital
records. In addition, there are templates
for continuity plans to get you started. 
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION:  AN ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL LAW (2d ed. 2010).
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
judicialdq.pdf/$file/judicialdq.pdf 
Over the past decade, Indiana law pro-
fessor Charles Gardner Geyh has
emerged as one of the leading scholars on
judicial ethics; he served as the Reporter
for the American Bar Association’s most
recent 2007 version of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct. His latest work is a
comprehensive review of the caselaw on
judicial disqualification in federal courts.
And this comprehensive, 113-page
review is available on the Internet.
To be sure, there are some differences
between the Code of Judicial Conduct
adopted in most states and the federal
statutes on disqualification. But there are
far more similarities than differences, and
federal cases may well be persuasive
when, as often happens, there are no on-
point precedents in your state. 
For example, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)
provides for disqualification when a
judge “has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party,” and so does Rule
2.11(A)(1) of the 2007 Model Code of
Judicial Conduct.  Similarly, both 28
U.S.C. § 455 (a) and Rule 2.11(A) of the
current Model Code provide that a judge
shall disqualify himself or herself when
the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” As we all know, there’s
room for interpretation about what those
words mean in specific situations.
Professor Geyh devotes about 30 pages to
an analysis of the cases on disqualifica-
tion under this standard. In doing so, he
provides both a useful framework for




PETER J. HENNING, ANDREW TASLITZ,
MARGARET L. PARIS, CYNTHIA E. JONES, &
ELLEN S. PODGOR, MASTERING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, VOLUME 1:  THE INVESTIGATIVE
STAGE. Carolina Academic Press, 2010.
376 pp. $32.00.
Both trial and appellate judges have a
difficult job handling criminal cases. For
many judges, they are the bulk of the
docket, and judges become familiar with
a great many of the legal rules applicable
to the cases. But the factual circum-
stances of these cases can be as varied as
the human imagination, which makes the
application of these rules frequently a
tricky proposition.
Faced with these questions in an area
encountered regularly, it can be helpful
from time to time to step back so as to
make sure that you don’t lose sight of the
forest when noting all the trees in your
path. To do this, judges should periodi-
cally review some authoritative reference
work that reviews all of the United States
Supreme Court cases that set the frame-
work for consideration of issues that arise
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. Five law-school professors
have joined to provide an excellent new
book that does a great job providing that
framework for analysis.
The book is written with law-school
students in mind, but that doesn’t lessen
its utility for judges. For Fourth
Amendment issues, for example, there are
separate chapters for searches of people
and for searches of cars, a chapter devoted
specifically to electronic surveillance, and
a chapter devoted to figuring out the
proper remedy for a Fourth Amendment
violation. Each chapter would be helpful
to judges in making sure that the problem
the judge is considering on a specific case
is properly placed in the context of
Supreme Court decisions and a reason-
able analytical framework.
Similar coverage is provided for issues
arising under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, including separate chap-
ters on the Miranda rule, due-process vol-
untariness, and the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. There also are helpful
chapters on the issues involved in entrap-
ment defenses and in eyewitness identifi-
cations.
Other separate chapters cover how to
decide whether the Fourth Amendment
applies at all; the rules about when a war-
rant is required, what's needed to get one,
and how a warrant must be executed; the
rules applicable to administrative and
special-needs searches; consent searches;
exigent circumstance; and plain view. 
The authors are working on a second
volume covering the adjudicatory stage
from bail to jail, including post-convic-
tion remedies.
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